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1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Deterrence, whether it be to counter cyber attacks, nuclear strikes, or playground bullies
relies upon a solid and demonstrable understanding of where an attack originated. If an
attacker knows his identity is unlikely to be determined, any threats made against him will fall
on deaf ears. The current global state of cyber security is one that routinely makes the news
as acts of cyber espionage, cyber crime, and cyber warfare close the gap in commonality with
their conventional counterparts. In any of these domains, attribution is without a doubt a
critical factor. This dissertation will lay the groundwork for this topic by analyzing the history
of cyber warfare, and demonstrating why deterrence is the superior, and perhaps only, way to
counter it.
Of course, great deal effort has been placed into discovering new ways to determine the
origin of attacks in cyberspace. Particularly within the decade from 1995 to 2005, there was
something of a genesis of this topic in the literature. While many of these methods proved
useful, many failed to find applications beyond the laboratory. The same set of assumptions is
used for many of these efforts — that a forensic analyst will be able to obtain, store, and analyze
whatever information is necessary for attribution (omniscience), that she will also be able to
place sensors in any place necessary to conduct attribution — perhaps even by covert means
(omnipresence), and that the choice of location for such systems will be correct for attributing
any attack (a priori positioning). A survey of the literature in this area is performed to show
how these assumptions are built into existing methods and why a new strategy is needed.
The problem of determining authorship is not unique to cyberspace. It is also not a new
problem. It has been known for at least a century that forensic analysis of documents can
reveal behavioral and linguistic signatures of the author, that the author expressed without
2realizing it. Whether it be handwriting, vocabulary, or even the choice of paper, many features
can be used to say whether two paper documents share authorship. Such methods have been
used extensively in literary analysis under the name Stylometry.
Similar methods have been applied to electronic mail, forum postings, software source code
(including viruses), and other forms of electronic communication (Morse Code operators were
even know to be recognizable by their cadence) with much success. The central question of
this dissertation is whether similar methods can be applied to network-level feature analysis.
To this end, a number of network-level features are derived from the IPv4 and TCP head-
ers of a dataset generated for this purpose. First, using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA), then a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and visual inspection of feature dis-
tribution histograms, and finally a Kolmogorov-Smirnov comparison of the individual feature
distributions, these features are evaluated for discriminatory power.
The major contribution of this work is a foundation for a new branch of network forensics
- Cyberprints. Just as a fingerprint can identify a burglar, the materials in a bomb identify
a bomb maker, and features of a fire can identify an arsonist, network-level features in traffic
streams show promise for attributing actions in cyberspace. This is accomplished without
making the assumptions of existing attribution methods, using relatively simple computations,
and considering a small final list of useful features. It is hoped, however, this work will be
extended to develop new methods to generate and analyze Cyberprints, and find new features
to use in such analyses.
For the unfamiliar reader, a glossary of technical terms used in this dissertation is included
before the bibliography.
3CHAPTER 2. CYBER DETERRENCE
2.1 History of Cyber Warfare
Exploitation of vulnerabilities in cyberspace is hardly a twenty-first century concept. As
long as nodes on the Internet have been able to communicate with each other, there have
been those willing to take advantage of them. What was perhaps the oldest known widespread
cyber attack was not even intended as an attack. In 1988, Robert Morris, a student at Cornell
University, wrote a program to count the number of nodes on the Internet. To do so, it used
known system vulnerabilities to replicate itself from machine-to-machine. In this regard, it was
largely successful, having reached an estimated 10% of the Internet - 60,000 nodes. However,
an unintended side effect of its exploitation method caused it to also crash the systems it
penetrated, leaving a trail of destruction in its path. Morris resulted in the first conviction in
the U.S. under the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, despite its benign intentions (Moore,
2008). The concept of self replicating software has since developed into the malicious codes
now referred to as worms.
In 1994, one of the first international cyber incidents to gain notoriety occurred at the Air
Force Rome Lab. At least 150 intrusions were detected there by system administrators, even-
tually traced to an Israeli. Unlike Morris, no damage occurred and there were no Israeli laws
at the time that made the action a crime, so the perpetrator escaped punishment (Beidleman,
2009). This highlighted the need for international coordination of criminal law and agreements
for cooperation to apprehend and prosecute offenders, a topic that will have a more thorough
treatment later in this dissertation.
To keep from being caught completely by surprise, good system administrators must view
their systems from an adversarial perspective. It was just such an exercise by the U.S. National
4Security Agency (NSA) Red Team in 1997 that led to an embarrassingly effective lesson in over-
confidence. During operation Eligible Receiver, simulated attackers were able to take control
of computers in the command center of the United States Pacific Command (PACOM), and
in power grids and 911 systems of nine major U.S. cities (Beidleman, 2009).
In a 1998 event, later named “Solar Sunrise”, over 500 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
computers were found to have been compromised by an unknown attacker (Beidleman, 2009).
A year later, an event named “Moonlight Maze” resulted in the breach of hundreds of com-
puters at the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Pentagon,
the Department of Energy (DOE), and other universities and laboratories. Information stolen
included technical research, contracts, encryption techniques, and information on war-planning
systems (Adams, 2001; Moore, 2008).
In 2003, what were believed to be Chinese attackers began infiltrating classified U.S. net-
works at an alarming rate in a operation named “Titan Rain” that is still under a veil of
secrecy (Moore, 2008; Thornburgh, 2005). In 2007, a penetration so great it has been called
“our electronic Pearl Harbor” compromised computers in the DOD, DOE, Department of State
(DOS), and Department of Commerce (DOC). The amount of information exfiltrated was suf-
ficient to fill the Library of Congress (Habiger, 2010). That same year, a trove of classified
data was found on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks such as Limewire. This included a diagram of
the U.S. Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), password change scripts for the
Pentagon’s SECRET network, encryption certificates allowing access to contractor systems,
the Pentagon’s information technology (IT) threat response plan, and threat assessments for
multiple U.S. cities (among other data) (Habiger, 2010). In 2008, an attack suspected to orig-
inate from Russia crossed into a classified network, creating enough alarm that the President
of the United States was personally briefed (Habiger, 2010).
The worst-case scenario in cyber warfare is an adversary that has the capability to paralyze
a victim in cyberspace, especially if the victim has a high dependency upon it. In April 2007,
the small country of Estonia was perhaps the first victim of an all out cyber barrage. While
one of the smallest former Soviet-bloc countries, Estonia has a technological base to rival many
5larger countries, and is one of the most “wired” nations in Europe (Beidleman, 2009). This
net-centricity became an Achilles’ heel when Estonia sustained what was calculated to be a
90 megabit per second (Mbps) onslaught of traffic for over ten hours (Moore, 2008). This
overwhelmed the networks and systems of the Estonian government and finance sectors, and
brought the country to a standstill. The attack originated from a network of software robot
implants (botnet) spread across compromised systems in seventy-five countries, but appeared
to be controlled by nodes in Russia. In fact, Estonia (and much of the rest of the world)
blamed Russia (Beidleman, 2009), but there was no solid evidence to link the attack to that
country and, thus, insufficient casus belli for a retaliation.
Again in 2008, Russia took heat when a series of cyber attacks took out many of the
government websites of the country of Georgia. These attacks occurred immediately before
a Russian air strike and clearly created a favorable battlefield for the Russian invasion. A
botnet was again found to be the method of attack. This time, instead of just choking out
legitimate traffic altogether, all traffic to and from Georgia was redirected through Russia
(Beidleman, 2009). This amounted to the first known cyber blockade and drew a great deal
of international condemnation. But once again, it could not be shown conclusively that the
Russian government was the perpetrator. Moscow placed the blame on a non-governmental
pro-Moscow activist youth group.
2.2 Difficulty of Defense
Network administrators and information security professionals are faced with an extremely
hostile environment. They are unable to classify the attackers, or even if they are attacking,
with any great accuracy. The nature and identity of attackers and attacks are constantly in flux.
A large number of vulnerabilities are unknowable to the administrator, and a single attacker
can cause damage disproportionately large compared to the resources available. On top of all
of this, systems often cannot be secured to the level necessary to fend off all attacks because
to do so would be to reduce their usability. Regardless of one’s opinions about “cyber-security
hype” or a “cyber-industrial/military-cyber” complex, these facts are axiomatic.
62.2.1 Lack of clear borders
Cyber territories do not always align with geo-political borders. In fact, many times they do
not even have clear boundaries. The U.S. DOD maintains an extensive global network named
the Global Information Grid (GIG). This network carries sensitive information required for the
successful execution of military operations around the world and clearly represents a valuable
asset. However, to maintain a global presence is to cross over many geo-political boundaries.
The GIG makes uses of strong encryption to ensure confidentiality, but often the links and
nodes that comprise it cross jurisdictions and are controlled by non-governmental parties.
One might make the case that the U.S. DOD has a clear interest in claiming cyber territorial
privilege over any link or router that carries information for the GIG. After all, in a large part
the Internet consists of information — a purely abstract concept. However, if an attack on the
GIG originates from a foreign country, traverses one, or terminates in one, does this fall into
U.S. jurisdiction?
Take a simpler case, a trans-Pacific submarine cable carrying this same information. It
is difficult to argue that while traveling on networks inside U.S. territories, this traffic is not
under U.S. jurisdiction. But how about a cable crossing from Los Angeles to Tokyo? At what
point does the traffic leave U.S. jurisdiction? Do we discount the link because of its high speed
and merely classify either endpoint as a basis for jurisdiction? What if a submarine vessel
places a tap on the cable deep under international waters (as the U.S. did during the Cold
War). Does jurisdiction now depend upon the origin of the traffic? The destination?
Since the UN Laws of Armed Conflict base their rationale for retaliation largely upon
territorial integrity (Beidleman, 2009), this is more than just a technicality. If a state cannot
prove that its sovereignty was threatened by an aggressor, a retaliation risks running afoul of
international law regarding the use of force (if, indeed, cyber attacks constitute a use of force).
Similarly, network administrators who wish to secure their networks by only allowing access
from trusted states will have quite a difficult time doing so. Even without any intent to disguise
his identity, an attacker’s Internet Protocol (IP) address might be difficult to track to a specific
country or city. It is likewise difficult to generate a list of “all addresses from Great Britain”
7versus “all addresses from Iran”.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for
delegating IP addresses to regional Internet registries (see Figure 2.1), who assign blocks of
addresses to internet service providers (ISPs). A multinational ISP might have a network
that spans geo-political borders or occasionally move network blocks between locations. The
regional authorities might release blocks of IP addresses, allowing them to be reassigned to a
different region entirely!
Figure 2.1 Regional Internet Registries
Granularity more fine than country level is even worse in many places. Since an ISP might
span the entire country and keep poor records (or none) of which address blocks are used
where, it might simply be impossible to determine an accurate location for an IP address.
Third parties, such as Google, have made use of open wireless access points to catalog IP
addresses they can detect in various areas. This information is sold into large databases, such
as MaxMind, and made available to security professionals, but must be constantly updated.
Access to these databases is often cost-prohibitive to administrators of smaller networks, leav-
ing them with only coarse estimates of geographical locations (such as the location of an ISP’s
corporate headquarters).
82.2.2 Asymmetry
The interaction between defenders and attackers in cyberspace is highly asymmetrical. A
network administrator must be constantly on guard, and make a large investment in software
and appliances to secure the network from attack. Information systems are highly complex,
and understanding of their internals and configuration is often highly compartmented. In
many large organizations, a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) must delegate security
monitoring of various systems to subordinates who are experts in those subject areas. In larger
networks, it might not be possible for a single network administrator, or even a small team, to
keep up with the constant stream of possible vulnerabilities to defend against.
For this reason, cyber defense requires a large investment of time, resources, and manpower
to achieve an acceptable level of security. On the other hand, if even a single flaw is left
unpatched - it is an Achilles’ Heel. If 1 out of 1000 servers did not receive the latest patch to its
web server software, that might be all it takes for a lucky attacker to gain entry into a company’s
systems and do further damage. Conversely, an attacker needs only a cheap computer and
Internet connection, and some time. Tools to automate the detection and exploitation of
vulnerabilities are widely available, often in the public domain (system administrators need
access to these to test their own security).
Simply put, a seemingly insignificant attacker can overcome huge investments in defense by
finding a single flaw - which is not difficult. Defenders must be constantly on guard, monitoring
every entry point to the network, keeping all systems up-to-date, and keeping abreast of new
developments in both offensive and defensive technology. Short of 9/11-type events, this is the
only domain in which an attacker has such extreme leverage.
2.2.3 Dynamic nature
Keeping abreast of new developments in offensive and defensive technology is literally a
full time job in many organizations. This is in addition to the fact that the very fabric of
the cyber domain is constantly in flux. The “consumerization of information technology”
has employees introducing entirely new classes of devices and applications to networks that
9security professionals must account for in the organization. The ongoing transition to IPv6
(the next version of the backbone protocol of the Internet) has dragged on for over a decade,
largely because system administrators are not comfortable with the security ramifications of
this switch. This is to say nothing about the constant evolution of the skills of attackers.
Indeed there is an arms race between cyber defenders and attackers. One need only to
open his email inbox to see this playing out in real time — network administrators are waging
a continuous battle against email spammers, who constantly find new ways to evade filters. A
system that was “secure enough” yesterday might become the “low hanging fruit” of today.
All it takes is for someone to release a tool or exploit code into the wild (information security
jargon for widespread public distribution), and anyone with a compiler can now break into
a system. A recent example of this phenomenon was the Debian SSL vulnerability in 2008
(DSA-1571-1, 2008). It was disclosed that the random number generator used to create the
certificates used to encrypt web traffic (among other things) was predictable. The very protocol
system administrators thought was protecting them turned out to be a vulnerability!
2.2.4 The unknown
A fact life for network administrators is that one simply cannot know what one doesn’t
know. For this reason, best practices documents and configuration guides run amok — at
least that way well-read network administrators can say they tried. But the brutal fact of the
matter is that no matter how much effort one puts into defending against the attack vectors
of yesterday, new attack vectors constantly appear. Anti-virus vendors are aware of this, and
thus do not rely solely on signature-based detection, but also use heuristics. They make an
attempt to classify nefarious executables not by what they look like, but by what they do.
Security professionals even have a special category set aside for attacks that make use of a
previously unknown vulnerability — zero-day exploits. This term is derived from the idea that
one can count the days from when a vulnerability is known until when a method of taking
advantage of the vulnerability (an exploit) is made available.
Zero-day exploits are those that occur on the “zeroth” day - computer science parlance for
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the first index in a list. By their definition, zero-day exploits cannot be foreseen. Usually, these
make use of a flaw in a piece of software running on a system. For example, many programs
have been found to be vulnerable to buffer overflows, whereby an attack is able to overflow
the memory allocated to hold user input. This overflow allows the attack to place malicious
code outside of the heap and in the stack; in other words, outside the data of a program and
in the program itself. By using techniques such as NOOP-sleds, a series of instructions that
tell the processor to simply continue to the next instruction, an attacker can maximize the
chance of tricking the vulnerable program into running the malicious instructions instead of
its normal execution sequence. Recent programming languages have better bounds checking
on user input and memory access, but these flaws continue to be found at an alarming rate.
A network administrator cannot possibly know the intricate workings of every system she
operates. Just using a web browser means having faith in millions of lines of code written by
a number of other individuals. An administrator who is in charge of a myriad of systems, each
with their own unique software applications and configurations (not to mention the operating
systems and infrastructure) has no choice but to trust the authors of the chosen software.
Therefore, it easy to see the great chasms in the understanding of the knowledge of the workings
of systems under an administrator’s care.
Assuming one does trust the authors of the software, which one has little choice but to
do (save federal agencies which require extensive code review for applications placed onto
sensitive networks), one must monitor the many channels of information providing notices of
new vulnerabilities and patches to each and every piece of software. Clearly, this can become
overwhelming. Add to this the fact that entirely new classes of attack vectors are being
discovered. For example, there has been much research lately into hardware trojans (e.g.,
Chakraborty et al., 2009; Tehranipoor and Koushanfar, 2010; Jin et al., 2009) - malicious
agents that run not within the operating system of a computer, but within its very brain!
Until this class of malware began being researched, network administrators did not know this
was something they needed to worry about. However, one is given to wonder to what extent
more advanced cyber attackers, such as nation-state level forces, were aware of and making
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use of these technologies.
Network infrastructures are also of greater concern than ever. While there has always
been much trepidation about questionably legal law-enforcement monitoring of communica-
tions (and, it should be said, this is not just limited to the digital age), questions have begun
to surface about larger scale, more clearly nefarious monitoring. While it is general knowledge
that China censors and monitors much or all of the Internet traffic of its citizens, recent events
have raised questions about whether they might be going even further. In 2010, a large share of
global Internet traffic was re-routed through China due to an incorrect modification of Internet
routing tables (Hijacking, 2010). While China claims this was unintentional, it shows that if a
state really desires, it can exert great influence over the communications of millions (and not
just those within its borders).
2.2.5 Third-parties
In addition to the reliance upon software engineers and programmers outside of one’s own
organization, an increasing unknown for network administrators comes in the form of partner-
ships with service providers. As more and more information moves “into the cloud”, network
administrators have less and less control over the security of their intellectual property. Google
has been widely criticized (though most vocally by Microsoft) for not taking seriously enough
the security concerns of its clients. To avoid this same mistake, companies, such as Verizon,
have created purpose-built data centers for federal, and even classified, information. However,
concerns about the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of data still are a stumbling block
for many organizations wishing to gain the many benefits of cloud-based services. A network
administrator must ultimately place her faith in these service providers, and trust that they
will protect information and services to the same extent she would herself.
Third-party relationships are not just limited to cloud-based services, however. Any time
a packet is sent across the network, it traverses the systems of a number of independent
network operators. While availability concerns are minimized by the survivable nature of IP
(specifically, the transmission control protocol - TCP), one still must place a great deal of trust
12
in these providers. As the “network hijacking” mentioned above illustrates, even the biggest
network providers are susceptible to error, if not intentional manipulation. One can make use
of transport encryption to make it difficult to intercept transmissions, but an attacker with
sufficient resources or knowledge of a vulnerability, such as the Debian SSL weakness mentioned
above, might still be able to gain information from these ostensibly protected traffic streams.
2.2.6 Usability
Most security professionals will attest that one of the biggest challenges of securing systems
is doing so while maintaining a user-friendly interface. A statement so common in security
circles it has become somewhat trite is “the only secure system is one that is unplugged and
locked in a safe”. Indeed, by making a system accessible in any way, one potentially opens
it up to attack. Security professionals must fight the stereotype that they exist only to make
the lives of “ordinary employees” more difficult. This author has heard pejorative terms such
as “profit prevention department” applied to information security departments on more than
one occasion. Indeed, it seems any action taken to secure a system must necessarily make it
more difficult to use. Security adds layers of authentication and authorization that users must
navigate. A system designed purely for usability would be one in which a user simply directly
performs the actions required to achieve the task at hand, without any ancillary interactions.
One might think of this as the polar opposite of the computer in a safe. Such a system would
have no way to ensure a user is who he claims to be, and is authorized to perform the requested
action.
Biometrics, or authentication based upon biological traits of the user, are a potential solu-
tion to this, but accuracy and affordability of such systems have yet to make these feasible for
everyday use. It is now more common to see laptops with built-in thumb print scanners, but
anyone who has used one will attest that they often go unused because of the frustration of
having to swipe one’s thumb on the sensor several times before it is correctly identified. Even
if perfect, such systems still require extra interaction from the user. There are potentially
transparent methods, such as facial recognition or embedded identification transmitters, but
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such systems raise concerns about privacy that many users are not willing to ignore.
Information assurance is usually defined as protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information (and there are a number of suggested “fourth elements” such as
non-repudiation). However, it might better be defined as working to find a balance between
these requirements and usability. While information security position advertisements often list
requirements of knowledge of applicable regulations and systems, it is increasingly common
to also see them mention knowledge of business operations. Without a practical awareness
of what users require to perform their jobs efficiently and pleasantly, security is a lost cause.
Post-it notes with passwords, copying data to external drives, emailing sensitive documents,
Internet web proxies, users will always find a way around security measures if they are not
able to use the system in the way they desire. Therefore, it is self-defeating for an information
security professional to foist draconian policies upon system users. The more restrictive they
become, the more users will try to find ways around them. But without strict adherence to
security principles, network administrators potentially leave open avenues of attack against
their systems.
2.2.7 Detection
Another large unknown for network administrators is knowledge of if and when they are
being attacked. In all other domains of warfare, it is (painfully) obvious when one is under at-
tack. Radar systems can provide preemptive warning of many types of aircraft, missiles, ships,
and satellites; port authorities and border patrols can monitor for unauthorized territorial in-
cursions. If an actual attack occurs, one immediately shifts into triage and recovery mode. To
date, cyberspace attacks are largely more analogous to espionage than armed combat. How-
ever, as will be discussed later, the transition between the two can happen instantaneously in
cyberspace. Whereas a certain tolerance and looking the other way goes on in the traditional
game of espionage, this is less tolerable in cyberspace. Therefore, automated systems able to
detect incoming attacks are required. Humans simply cannot observe, analyze, and react at
the speed required for a cyber skirmish.
14
Despite years of research, intrusion detection and prevention systems are still far from
perfect. They require a huge investment of time to set up and calibrate to avoid constant
false alarms, but with every reduction in false alarms comes the potential for missing an actual
attack. Methods to detect attacks in-progress have evolved from simple IP address blacklists,
to signature-based analysis, to heuristic analysis (which mirror, in some ways, the detection of
viruses on workstations). Most intrusion detection systems rely upon signature-based analysis,
where certain sequences of network traffic trigger alarms. This does little to detect zero-day
exploits. It will also miss many of the tell-tale signs of an impending attack — network
scans. But to allow detection of these scans is to invite a deluge of alerts, as the “background
radiation” (Zimmerman et al., 2005) of the Internet is rife with automated scanning traffic.
2.3 Why Deterrence?
One might ask why deterrence is necessary at all. After all, there is no cyber equivalent
of a nuclear attack, where the target finds itself utterly unable to mount any effective defense.
Cyber warfare is much more subtle and nuanced than that. As discussed elsewhere in this
dissertation, it is often more comparable to espionage than to armed combat. However, after
having explained many of the reasons cyber defense is so hard above, hopefully this question
is somewhat clearer.
2.3.1 Justifications
It has been explained how one cannot possibly hope to defend every potential avenue of
entry by his adversaries. Even if one has an unlimited budget to hire security professionals
and purchase security software and appliances, there will still be the obstacles of proprietary
confidentiality, poorly-written code, unforeseen consequences of even well-written code, and of
course the human element (Evans, 2009).
Put simply, eliminating potential vulnerabilities is not an option. This is not to say that
network administrators should not take every precaution and implement best practices such
as least-privilege, isolation/compartmentalization, regular update cycles, and regular vulner-
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ability assessments. If it were not for these practices, network administrators would likely
find themselves constantly ensnared in constant low-skill dragneting by every teenager with an
Internet connection. Therefore, if one cannot close all doors to potential exploitation, one can
at best hope to deter the enemy from walking through them.
One cannot enumerate all potential adversaries in the cyber realm. It is then not possible
to calibrate defensive systems to even detect, let alone prevent, all possible attacks. It is
impossible to avoid talk of the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) in security circles. Such
actors are well-funded, well-trained, and determined. Often they take the form of a unit within
the armed forces of a state.
While most intrusion detection systems are designed to look for patterns of traffic known
bad within single traffic streams, or perhaps within the last few hours or days of traffic, these
attacks could entail years of research and development by the attacker. The infiltration of
the Bushehr nuclear centrifuge facility in Iran is suspected to have undergone years of highly-
funded, highly-collaborative, and yet highly-secretive development to tailor it precisely for the
cyber environment of Bushehr. Network administrators at all levels are simply not capable of
detecting and mitigating attacks of this level of sophistication.
Even if one can detect an attack and attribute it to an attacker, the chances of successfully
bringing prosecution against the attacker, let alone winning a verdict, are hopelessly slim. In
the best case scenario, an attacker directly attacks a well-prepared domestic target with little
or no attempt to hide her identity. In this case, domestic law enforcement can use the audit
information from the victim to look up the IP address of the attacker, subpoena the ISP for the
identity of the user attached to that address at the time of the attack, and bring a sufficiently
convincing civil or criminal case to win a guilty plea from the attacker. However, there are a
number of assumptions here.
First is the assumption of a well-prepared defender. While cyber defenses have likely im-
proved among network administrators at all levels in recent years (due to heightened awareness,
and enrollment in training programs and degrees), there are still undoubtedly large numbers
of network administrators who simply “plug and play”. This is reflected in the Internet Crime
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Complaint Centers’ 2010 Annual Report (Center, 2010). While regulations exist for the protec-
tion of health care information, records of publicly-traded corporations, financial information,
military secrets, and payment card information; much of cyberspace remains a “wild west”.
Without regulations, and audits to enforce them, many network administrators never have
cause to investigate the security of their networks. Thus, these networks remain only as pro-
tected as the default installation parameters allow. Such network administrators, if they even
have audit logs of activity on their network, might not be able to access them, or might not
keep sufficient history to be able to track down an attacker after the fact.
It was entertaining to many in the security industry to learn that the attacks perpetrated by
the Anonymous group against the likes of Visa and Mastercard in the wake of their termination
of accounts related to Anonymous funding were in fact not in the least bit anonymous (Pras
et al., 2010). The tool of choice for this group was the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC), a tool
which accepts commands from an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) network (or can be run manually)
to work in concert with other machines running the software to attempt to overwhelm the
network connections and servers of targets. However, the tool does not make any attempt to
mask its IP address, making it trivial for targets to block and attribute attackers. But this is
the exception, not the rule. Most tools come with at least one way to disguise one’s identity,
and entire applications are built to do just this (e.g., Tor: The Onion Router). While there are
legitimate uses of such tools, in particular bypassing the censoring mechanisms of oppressive
regimes, they are often used by those who wish to hide their identity online.
In fact any cyber attacker worth his salt will not make the mistake of directly attacking
a target. He will first compromise lower-sensitivity targets on which he is unlikely to be
caught, and build a chain through the Internet to obfuscate his true identity. This is called
the stepping-stone method of anonymization and is the same basic premise used by Tor. In
these cases, due to jurisdictional or logistical issues, it might be simply impossible to unravel
the chain of systems to make it back to the original attacker.
Jurisdiction is an issue in and of itself. Even if one is able to readily identify the identity of
an attacker, she might be unable to prosecute due to the nature of the territory in which the
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attacker resides. The foreign state might be simply covering for a state-sponsored attack, but
more often privacy, legal, or national identity roadblocks prevent collaboration from taking
place. For example, while China might be unwilling to cooperate on the grounds that it does
not trust the United States to prosecute one of its citizens, Germany is legally unable to
release this information because of domestic legislation regarding the privacy of its citizens.
Some countries might simply have no laws which would make the attack illegal, and thus it is
not subject to prosecution. One can see how transnational organizations can quickly become
entangled in such bureaucratic tugs-of-war, let alone an organization without a presence in the
foreign country. Especially if one is simply trying to unravel a chain of stepping-stone’s where
he cannot even say the information requested is in fact of an actual criminal!
Assuming a cooperative territory and ISP, and a rock-solid attribution to an IP address,
one must still account for the fact that the ISP might not keep records of sufficient detail to
identify the user of a particular IP address. As most ISPs make use of dynamic addressing
for their clients, it is entirely possible that an IP address has been shuﬄed among a number
of different individuals by the time the request for its owner is received. The dynamic host
configuration protocol (DHCP) does not have any tracking history, so it is up to the particular
implementation of the protocol to extended it to add this functionality. Even if this is done,
the information might not be kept very long because of the storage space required.
If all of this is resolved, one must then hopefully elicit a confession from the attacker,
and find an applicable statute under which the action is worthy of prosecution. Without an
applicable statute, there is no basis for further repercussions and the victim is simply out of
luck. As law often lags technology, there are constantly new permutations of cyber attacks
which fall into gray areas. Some countries simply have no laws applicable to cyberspace.
But even if they do, without a confession the case must still go to court. In this case, the
attorneys are saddled with explaining the highly technical details of Internet communications,
attribution, cyber attacks, and digital forensics through the use of expert witnesses. Most
juries are likely to struggle to understand these facts, and some might even be simply hostile
to any mention of cyberspace. Under U.S. statutes a jury verdict must be reached by the
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preponderance of evidence (civil trial) or proof beyond a reasonable doubt (criminal trial). To
remove even 51% of doubt from the minds of jurors in such cases is no doubt quite difficult,
raising the bar for conviction.
2.3.2 Alternatives
It is worth asking if there might be more sure-fire alternatives to deterrence. Deterrence
after all, is merely a formal process of hedging one’s bets or changing the perceptions of the
odds by those being bet against. Like any risk assessment or mitigation process, it is full
of uncertainty. One can make it so that only an insane individual would take the chance of
attacking, but there are no shortage of adversaries with questionable grips on reality. What
then are other ways to overcome the difficulty of defense and why are they not preferable?
First, we return to the unplugged server in the safe. Joking aside, isolation is a practical
strategy. Granted no one takes it quite so far, but it is used in many other ways. For example,
the U.S. DOD makes use of a number of different networks for different levels of classifica-
tion. There is the NIPR-net (the non-classified IP routing network), SIPR-net (secret), and a
number of networks at higher security levels, such as top secret and sensitive compartmented
information. These networks are nominally “air-gapped” from one another, meaning that
ideally there is no communication channel between different levels of networks.
This principle almost never holds for practical reasons. Often unclassified databases must
be used on a classified network. Perhaps some information has been declassified and must be
moved to a less sensitive network. Perhaps automated intelligence gathering systems needs to
operate agents in environments not secure enough to operate a sensitive network, but need to
feed information into classified systems. Whatever the case, one at a time, breaks are made in
this air gap. The most common is “sneaker net”, the physical transfer via removable media,
photograph, or transcription of sensitive information. This is how Bradley Manning allegedly
exfiltrated a large number of secret U.S. DOS cables. But, even users who have no ill will can
become frustrated when they are trying to “just do their jobs” and are unable to do something
as simple as copy an unclassified document onto their classified system, leading to breaches
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of isolation measures. Trying to prevent users from doing so by removing external interfaces,
locking down applications, or other technical measures merely escalates the amount of effort
users will exert to bypass them.
Critical infrastructure operators claim their networks are entirely “off-grid”. After all, it
is hard to imagine that a nuclear power plant’s control rod mechanism having a web presence
will lead to anything good. But increasingly, it is being discovered that Internet links to such
“isolated” systems exist, even unbeknown to their operators. Often, this takes the form of a
backdoor the vendor installed to perform remote maintenance, but increasingly the networks
used in the front office and the control systems are interconnected. In power distribution
systems, this potentially exposes a large number of substations and other remote systems to
Internet exposure. To return to the example of Bushehr, U.S.B thumb drives were used to
trick employees of the plant into loading malicious software onto their network. Isolation is
bound for failure.
So, if it is accepted that at some point all systems will have exposure to hostile agents,
what other options are there? The most obvious is to return fire. Certainly this is the most
dramatic alternative. When under attack, one could counterattack in an attempt to take out
the adversary before she can do any harm. However, this is unlikely to be successful for several
reasons. Most practically, it is unlikely the defender will become aware of the ongoing attack
in time to mount an effective response against it. In the case of an APT, the attack might be a
marathon instead of a sprint, but there is likely to be little to set off alarm bells until damage
is already in process. Most cyber attacks happen in an instant, and most are not worthy of
a response. If one were to respond to every unauthorized attempt for entry into his network,
it would quickly consume all of his time (and then some) and, as discussed momentarily, be
unlikely to have much success.
The probability of identifying the attacker (including removing any layers of anonymiza-
tion), enumerating an exploitable weakness in her system, and exploiting it within the time
span of an attack is nearly zero. Considers that an APT spends months or years identifying
exploitable vulnerabilities and assume that an attacker secures his system against all threats
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known to him. This leaves little chance that an exploitable vulnerability is even present, let
alone readily identifiable. This requires the defender to discriminate retaliation-worthy targets
from harmless annoyances. An SSH server (a remote login service allowing console access to
a system) might see thousands of intrusion attempts in a day, coming from hundreds of hosts
(speaking from this author’s own experience). To retaliate against each and every attacker is
certainly impossible, especially considering that the number of intrusion attempts scales with
the size of the network.
So, a defender is unlikely able to successfully isolate himself and would waste his effort
in attempting retaliations. What is left? Simply put, sit there and take it, but do so in an
intelligent way. First, one can make her network sufficiently resilient to attack that even if
an attacker is successful in taking down or damaging systems, the organization continues to
function. This significantly increases the cost of one’s network, but resiliency is likely to be
the case anyway due to the best practice of avoiding single points of failure. Resiliency does
much to take care of availability concerns and potentially some integrity concerns, and can
act as a deterrent in and of itself by signaling attackers that attempts to take out systems
are unlikely to be successful. However, it does nothing to address concerns of confidentiality.
Even if a database of social security numbers is stolen from only one of ten servers, this does
not lessen the impact of it being stolen. In fact, maintaining ten servers actually increases the
potential attack surface and requires network administrators to ensure that ten times as many
systems are appropriately secured. One must also ensure that replication of data between
systems is done in a controlled and reversible way, so if the integrity of data on one system is
compromised, this does not also pollute all replicants of that data.
Finally is the attempt to divert attacks from one’s systems. The most common method
is to set up a “honeypot” or “honeynet”, a system or network of systems which serve no
purpose other than to attract attackers. By makings these systems sufficiently enticing (but
not ostentatiously so), an administrator can encourage an attacker to spend time attacking
a decoy system instead of the actual corporate network. Additionally, such systems can be
specially instrumented to provide information that can be used to reveal the methods of the
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attackers. This can help network administrators stay ahead of the attacker and proactively
secure production networks.
While this all sounds good, there are several snags. First is that one cannot be sure attackers
will take the bait. Assume that a decoy network will, at best, be as enticing as the real network,
and the administrator sets up one decoy network. Then at best there is a 50:50 chance the
attacker will pick the decoy to target. While perhaps these networks can be made more
enticing by opening additional vulnerabilities and planting fake data, sophisticated attackers
are likely to see through such ruses, which might intensify the “attention” the production
network receives. If attackers have done their homework, meaning open source intelligence
gathering, they will be able to quickly see behind the false front. Something as simple as
identifying which network a company’s web server is actually running on can defeat the entire
decoy.
There also remain legal questions in some jurisdictions related to wiretapping and entrap-
ment. If the decoy network is run by a law enforcement agency (or perhaps a contractor of
one), it might be construed as enticement to commit a crime, which might not only exempt
the attacker from prosecution, but could land the network operator in hot water. Even if the
network is operated by a private network operator, evidence obtained might lack a solid footing
in a legal proceeding. Perhaps the attacker knew it was a decoy and, therefore, knew that he
wouldn’t cause any actual damage? Maybe he wouldn’t have attacked it if it was a real net-
work. Perhaps the enticement to attack by intentionally leaving open vulnerabilities with the
intent to gather intelligence is sufficient to constitute authorization by the network operator of
the otherwise illicit use. Additionally, using information obtained from such networks without
explicit consent of the user might run afoul of wiretapping laws. While corporations usually
have little restriction on the monitoring of their internal networks, it is usually advisable to
have users consent to this ahead of time to avoid any legal issues. If the attacker is not made
aware that his actions are monitored, the operator might violate the Federal Wiretap Act,
which permits observation of activities on one’s own networks only with consent from those
being monitored.
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Therefore, while deterrence is far from a sure-fire method of preventing cyber attacks, it
might be a more effective defensive tactic than the alternatives. Isolation is not likely to last,
retaliation is not feasible, resiliency does not cover all the bases, and misdirection seems like
somewhat of a minefield. The only option is to prevent the adversary from becoming the
attacker — to stop the attack before it begins.
2.4 Classical Deterrence
2.4.1 Objectives
There is an extensive body of literature that can help shed light on the problem of deterrence
as a result of the Cold War. However, this idea is much older. In the Peloponnesian War
writings (431-404BCE), Thucydides describes ways in which enemies sought to entice each
other from starting or expanding a war (George and Smoke, 1974). As with cyber war, the
risk of nuclear war presents a terrifying specter for which no one can exactly calculate the
outcome. However, in many ways nuclear deterrence is much easier.
The fundamental problem of deterrence is simple and anyone who experienced (or was) a
playground bully can understand the basic idea. Deterrence policies seek to affect the behavior
of an adversary with the use of calculated threats (Achen and Snidal, 1989; National Defense
Strategy of the United States, 2008). This might be used to prevent a direct attack, to secure
strategic access and freedom of action globally, to comfort allies and strengthen relationships,
to establish favorable security conditions as a hedge in case a need for military action should
arise (National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2005), or to protect allies from attack
(National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2008).
It is common to think of deterrence as a kind of mental calculus performed by both the
aggressor and the defender. The benefits of aggression (or retaliation) sit on one end of a
hypothetical seesaw, with the consequences of aggression (or retaliation) on the other. The
consequences of restraint (e.g., appearing weak or risking an attack from the intended victim)
and risk-taking propensity of the aggressor act as a fulcrum in this balancing act and can be
moved closer to one end or the other by external factors (Beeker, 2009; DOJOC, 2006). For
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example, a country might know there is a resource they very much desire within a neighbor’s
borders that could be obtained through an invasion (benefit of aggression), but it also knows
that international sanctions are likely to follow if it proceeds with the attack (consequences
of aggression). If the international body that would sanction them appears distracted with
another matter, it might push the fulcrum towards the consequences, meaning the benefits now
appear to outweigh the risks and the country is likely to proceed with the invasion. Conversely,
if the neighboring country has recently developed a nuclear strike capability, the fulcrum is
shoved the other direction.
2.4.2 Methods
Deterrence relies on the ability to raise the perceived costs of aggression or lower the per-
ceived benefits (Beidleman, 2009). A number of methods can be used. The primary method of
raising perceived costs is to make a clear statement and demonstration of retaliatory capability
(Beidleman, 2009). To be credible, the threatened retaliation must be both proportional to
the deterred action, and clearly within the capabilities (politically as well as logistically) of the
defender (Taipale, 2010). The greater the certainty of retaliation, the greater the deterrent
effect (Taipale, 2010). It must also be obvious to the aggressor that if they exercise restraint,
the resulting outcome will be desirable for them (DOJOC, 2006; Jervis et al., 1989).
Another method of deterrence, which had limited utility in nuclear war, is to demonstrate
the futility of attack (Beidleman, 2009). If the aggressor believes that her actions will butt
up against strong defenses or otherwise have an insignificant effects, they are less likely to
invest time and resources developing the attack. Unfortunately in the Cold War, there was
little defense for a nuclear explosion. Civil defense drills, underground shelters, and attempts
to shoot down missiles before they detonated were the extent of it, and none were particularly
effective.
In nuclear deterrence, the credible threat of retaliation was the primary factor keeping
a lid on the pot. Assurances from both the Soviet Union and the United States that any
attack would result in severe, swift, and incontestable retaliation kept the peace for over thirty
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years (Achen and Snidal, 1989; National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2008). The
Nuclear Deterrence Triad — the term for the primary deterrent threats — consisted of long-
range bombers, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs) (Chilton, 2008). The combination of these three prevented any notion of a
single attack able to completely disable the enemy.
Today, deterrence has evolved into multi-actor deterrence in the modern world. However, it
is not entirely removed from Cold War-era strategies and does not fully mesh with cyberspace
realities. It is a much more complex process, requiring an integration of military powers with
diplomatic, informational, and economic (DOJOC, 2006). Global strike capability lives on, but
makes more use of forward deployed units in “force projection” missions than on long-range
devastation (though it remains an option) (DOJOC, 2006). A large degree of global situational
awareness is required to keep tabs on the objectives and values of the many potential adversaries
that must be deterred. This requires a high-speed global network (such as the GIG) to enable
forward deployments in adversary networks and communication between distant forces working
on the same mission (DOJOC, 2006). It must not only deter specific aggressive behaviors, but
specific targets of aggression and outcomes of aggression (Taipale, 2010).
Deterrent threats must also be tailored to specific adversaries (DOJOC, 2006), as the
threats that influence one aggressor might have no effect on another. For example, the threat
of being caught in the act might be a serious concern for a state involved in espionage against
an ally, but have no effect upon a state with which relations are strained. Similarly, the threat
of lethal force loses its edge when dealing with a suicide bomber. Even within a particular state,
deterrence must be targeted to many different levels of decision-makers to ensure that deterrent
signals (communications between a defender and aggressor of a retaliatory threat) are properly
heard and interpreted (DOJOC, 2006). However, while threats must be sufficiently clear,
precisely targeted, and credible to present a real threat, sufficient ambiguity must remain to
preserve flexibility of retaliation and prevent precisely calibrated challenges from the aggressor
that approach cross retaliation thresholds without crossing them (Taipale, 2010).
A good summary of current deterrence thinking is present in the U.S. Deterrence Operations
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Joint Operating Concept (DOJOC, 2006). Here, there is an outline for integrating deterrence
into military planning. One must specify the deterrence objectives and strategic context, assess
the decision calculus of adversaries, identify desired effects on adversary’s decision calculus,
develop and assess tailored courses of action for deterring the adversary, and finally execute and
monitor the methods for effectiveness. A similar outline applies in cyberspace, but assessing
the decision-making calculus of adversaries becomes incredibly difficult when dealing with the
small timescales, the large variety of adversaries, and the highly anonymous nature of the
Internet.
2.4.3 Problems
Deterrence theory comes with a set of caveats, mostly based in the psychology of deterrence.
After all, the reality is that humans are not perfectly logical beings and the world is not as
simple as a game of chess. Decision-makers are faced with complex situations with many
interwoven factors, including emotions, beliefs, and biases on the part of both the aggressor and
the defender (Jervis et al., 1989). The amount of effort needed to fit the mold of a completely
rational and logical decision-maker is unlikely to be met. An alternative description is that
of Cybernetic Decision Making, whereby decision-makers only marginally adjust immediate
actions without a complete picture of the long-term consequences, much as a thermostat makes
a nearsighted decision as to whether or not to turn on the air conditioner (Steinbruner, 1976).
In any case, deterrence theories must attempt to approximate the thinking of decision-makers,
and the effects of deterrent threats upon them.
Compounding this uncertainty is the difficulty of “getting in the head” of potential adver-
saries. After all, there are a wide range of adversaries in the post-Cold War world — state,
criminal, extremist, state-affiliated or encouraged, fundamentalists — all with different cus-
toms and behaviors. This makes it very difficult to accurately predict how an adversary might
perceive a deterrent threat (DOJOC, 2006). The challenge is to gather enough intelligence
about an adversary’s perceptions and intentions to at least approximate the process of deter-
rence calculus, but this is very difficult and it is hard to find cases of even mild international
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conflict where both sides accurately made such assessments (Jervis, 1984). When consider-
ing the case of irrational actors, such as psychopathic or extremist actors, it becomes nearly
impossible to predict how an adversary will respond to a deterrent threat.
Understanding the threat an adversary might present is another challenge. Certain ad-
versaries might make unsubstantiated threats, have a history of a particular kind of violence,
or be suspected of ties with known aggressors. However, decision-makers must be careful not
to fall prey to the biases of availability and representativeness when assessing these threats
(Jervis et al., 1989). The former is the psychological term for the logical fallacy of determining
an event more likely based upon experience or knowledge, but not necessarily upon the actual
probability of the event occurring. The latter is essentially a term to mean making an error
in judgment due to stereotypes or prejudices. For example, assuming an Islam fundamentalist
presents a threat of suicide attack regardless of whether he has any history of violent behavior.
In fact, the most successful attacks are those for which the defender has not adequately pre-
pared. Attacks, such as these, that come as a surprise usually do so because they are unlikely
to succeed and have been downplayed by the defender (Jervis et al., 1989).
Presenting a credible threat to the adversary (or “signaling”) is equally difficult. It must
be made explicit to the adversary what the stakes are, without providing sufficient information
about retaliation capability for the adversary to counter it. It might be believed by the defender
that an aggressor has received a deterrent signal, but, due to cultural misunderstandings, the
message was lost. Such communication breakdowns can lead to situations where a retaliation
is judged as unjustified by the aggressor, because the deterrent threat was not understood
(Jervis et al., 1989).
In summary, there is a four fold problem to determine likely attacks. Decision-makers are
not likely to analyze a situation in a logical and calculated way, are likely to make biased or
misguided estimates of the true threats, run the risk of a signaling miscommunication, and
are likely to ignore the threats most likely to turn into an attack. Enemies who believe their
stake in a successful attack outweighs the risk (or certainty) of a retaliation, or are otherwise
sufficiently determined, will likely ignore deterrent threats (Achen and Snidal, 1989; DOJOC,
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2006).
2.5 Cyber Deterrence
With a basic analysis of both cyber warfare and classic deterrence completed, it is important
to now examine how cyberspace contorts the ideas of deterrence. Traditional deterrence focused
upon a universal deterrence policy to deter all threats (Morgan, 1977). Cyberspace will require
deterrence to be tailored for new classes of attackers and attacks, and require new ways of
thinking about deterring attackers. Blotzer (2000) characterizes the necessary new deterrence
paradigm as focusing on the carrot and not the stick. That is to say that the U.S. can no longer
rely solely on the threat of overwhelming, precisely targeted force to deter a single adversary.
Instead, the U.S. must focus on what adversarial leadership values most and seek ways to
develop enticements for continued peace. The National Defense Strategy of the United States
(2008) emphasizes the use of non-military and defensive tactics in this way:
The same developments that add to the complexity of the challenge also offer us a
greater variety of capabilities and methods to deter or dissuade adversaries. This
diversity of tools, military and non-military, allows us to create more plausible
reactions to attacks in the eyes of opponents and a more credible deterrence to
them. In addition, changes in capabilities, especially new technologies, permit us
to create increasingly credible defenses to convince would-be attackers that their
efforts are ultimately futile.
2.5.1 Attackers and attacks
One of the most difficult parts of cyber deterrence is identifying the correct threats to deter.
Often, a threat is unknown until a successful attack has occurred. There is no way to see the
enemy preparing for cyber battle, to track the development of cyber arms (without an explicit
declaration by the adversary), and no way to know all of the attacks that have been tried
but failed (or just have not been detected) (Habiger, 2010). Conventional deterrence relied
upon early detection of attacks to give time to mount a retaliatory strike — in cyberspace
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there is no such luxury (Beeker, 2009). Small groups of cyber-savvy attackers can amass a
disproportionately large attack that would not be possible in traditional warfare (Habiger,
2010) in no time at all.
Considering state-sponsored cyber aggression alone, there are over 100 potential adver-
saries (Habiger, 2010). Some of the scariest names in U.S. foreign policy are already on the
bandwagon. The Russian military has incorporated cyber warfare into its deterrence strategy
and recognized the role of information superiority (Sinks, 2008). China is preparing at least a
battalion of cyber warriors (Sinks, 2008), has openly discussed goals to dominate the U.S. in
cyberspace by 2050 (Habiger, 2010), and in 2008 successfully hacked the White House email
(Habiger, 2010). Hezbollah has outlined a strategy of cyber attacks to disrupt Israeli cyber
systems (Sinks, 2008). Al-Qaeda computers seized in Afghanistan were found to contain elec-
tronic schematics and simulation software of dam control systems (Beidleman, 2009), as well
as logs indicating research into U.S. critical infrastructures. Iraqi insurgents were known to
use off-the-shelf software costing $26 to hack into the live feeds from U.S. aerial drone’s and
intercept the video streams (Habiger, 2010). This is not to mention that anyone with access
to some cash can hire a botnet to do the dirty work (Moore, 2008). Andrew Palowitch, a
former Central Intelligence Agency official now a consultant for the U.S. Strategic Command
and head of the U.S. Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations, recently stated that the
U.S. Department of Defense has been the subject of 80,000 cyber attacks, some of which have
clearly reduced its operational capacity (Habiger, 2010). Cyber attackers should not be taken
lightly.
Taipale (Taipale, 2010) places attackers into three primary groups: 1) those who can be
deterred directly, 2) those who can be deterred indirectly, and 3) those who are not likely to
be deterred. The first group is what classical deterrence is built upon. A single enemy to
whom threats of retaliation can be credibly made. The second group is increasingly important
in the international spider web of alliances and skirmishes, and non-state groups of attackers.
Such groups might be difficult to pin down to threaten directly, but by placing pressure on
a known party upon which the attacker depends, deterrence might still succeed. The third
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group is the most difficult, and is perhaps the primary group in the current state of cyber
affairs. These attackers are either so confident in their anonymity, careless as to the costs of
their actions, or devoted to their cause (or any combination of those things) that it is unlikely
that any deterrence strategy will be effective. Groups such as these might be sponsored by,
or even a part of, aggressive governments, but hide underneath a dense shroud of deception
and misdirection to prevent affiliation, or at least offer plausible deniability. Without knowing
whom adversary decision-makers are, it is difficult to understand the ideology, objectives,
perceptions, methods, and risk-taking propensity of an adversary. It also makes in virtually
impossible to communicate directly with an adversary, in the style of the direct communications
between leaders that helped avoid nuclear war between the U.S. and theSoviet Union.
2.5.2 Deterrent threats
What methods of deterrence might be available in cyberspace? It should first be emphasized
that deterrence does not necessarily mean retaliation in the same domain (Beeker, 2009). Just
as a border incursion by ground forces might be countered by an air strike, a cyber infiltration
could potentially open up retaliatory options in other domains. However, “fighting fire with
fire” raises fewer questions of the proportionality of the counter-attack (Libicki, 2009). Where
can the line be drawn for cyber attacks warranting conventional retaliation? Reconnaissance,
penetration, infiltration, damage to information, damage to cyber assets, damage to physical
assets, damage to critical infrastructures, or loss of life? The potential array of cyber attacks
is wide. However, stating that the U.S. will only retaliate to cyber attacks in-kind weakens it
greatly by taking some of its strongest assets off the table (Libicki, 2009).
Some (e.g., Beeker, 2009; Chilton, 2008) propose a new deterrence triad: strike capability,
defense fortifications, and responsive infrastructure (network operations). This new triad must
emphasize the integration of these three components to maximize effect. A similar sentiment is
echoed in Taipale 2010, which lays out a framework for cyber deterrence that includes penalty,
futility, and dependency.
Penalty is the classic deterrent threat. However, one unique aspect of cyber retaliation is
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the difficulty of predicting the ramifications. This has three potential problems. First, there is
the potential for incidentally attacking innocent bystanders who stand between the defender
and aggressor. Without a complete understanding of the path the attack will take (which is
guesswork, at best due to the highly interconnected nature of the Internet), a retaliator risks
unintended consequences. Second, if a counter-attack is made but results in no actual damage,
it not only leaves the defender looking helpless, but also invites counter-retaliation (Libicki,
2009). Third, the U.S. could find its hands tied by making overly specific retaliatory threats
or threats to retaliate against exactly those actions that would be used to retaliate (Beeker,
2009).
Another complication of cyber-retaliation is to demonstrate its credibility. In nuclear war,
it was seemingly routine for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to conduct publicized tests of
nuclear weapons. This left little doubt in the adversary’s mind that the retaliation capability
existed. However, in the cyber realm the success of an attack depends on many factors not
likely known a priori. For example, exploits in software depend highly upon the version of
that software used by a target. Even within a single military base there could be ten different
versions of Microsoft Windows, all with different security patches applied! The challenge is
to demonstrate the ability to mount a cyber counter-attack, without specific knowledge of the
target, and/or without giving away too much information about the attack or knowledge of the
target to allow the adversary to defend against the attack (Beeker, 2009; Taipale, 2010). It is
a bit like having to tailor a bunker-busting bomb to detonate at a specific depth below ground
level to destroy a control room without any knowledge of the architecture of the bunker!
For this reason, the most important pillars of cyber deterrence are probably futility through
a strong defense. This doesn’t require a large investment in offensive capabilities, international
consensus, or questions of contestability. Defensive fortifications serve as a noise filter for
attackers, allowing states to focus only on serious threats (Libicki, 2009), and prevents the need
for retaliation. By demonstrating over time that a state’s systems are secure and resilient, it
stands to reason that an enemy’s perception of the benefits of attacking will decrease (Habiger,
2010).
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Dependency requires a state find ways to encourage potential adversaries to rely upon it
to achieve their objectives (Taipale, 2010). A good example is the Global Positioning System
(GPS). This system is operated by U.S. contractors and agencies, but its destruction would
have negative impacts on adversaries. Primarily, any adversary who relies upon GPS for
navigation or targeting would be impaired. However, it also would have the effect of making
attacks by the U.S. less precise, thus increasing the chances of collateral damage and making
the effects of a U.S. counterattack even worse (Beeker, 2009).
The U.S. is certainly in a position to leverage dependencies in many areas of cyberspace
today. The majority of the root name servers, responsible for directing human-readable domain
names to computer-readable addresses, are housed in the U.S.. Many of the world’s largest
sources of news, research, entertainment, and information are accessible to the world only
through the networks of telecommunications operators based in the U.S.. These and other
dependencies provide the U.S. a very large “carrot” with which to keep adversaries at bay.
To deny benefits, a defender must enhance its ability to detect and even preempt cyber
attacks. This is a field where a great deal of research remains and the nature of cyberspace
presents no small challenge. Second, it must be made obvious that the defender has the
ability to fight through a cyber attack. It should be made obvious that the defender is not
entirely dependent upon cyberspace, and is capable of operating without it. This is quite
a feat in the days of software radios, GPS navigation, remotely-controlled drones, and high-
grade encryption. By hardening potential targets, introducing redundancies and resiliencies
where necessary, tightly controlling access to critical systems, and obfuscating the available
information about cyber infrastructures, the defender can lower the temptation of attacking
its cyber infrastructure.
2.5.3 Open questions
It should be obvious at this point that the matter of deterring cyber attacks is far from
settled. A further examination of problems with cyber deterrence will be conducted later, but
for now it is enlightening to consider some key questions posed in the literature.
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First, is deterrence already working (Libicki, 2009)? This might seem like a silly question,
given the large amount of press coverage of cyber intrusions and the amount of government
effort going into developing deterrence and offensive capabilities. However, it can be said
that to this point there is no known example of a cyber attack that has resulted in damage
comparable to a conventional attack. Most recorded episodes are tantamount to espionage,
not attack. This is despite, as mentioned above, the large number of actors who are more than
capable of conducting such attacks. So it is fair to ask whether the U.S. need to up the ante.
Perhaps the U.S. is already formidable enough, both on the cyber battlefield and off, that a
large number of potential cyber attacks are already deterred. Assuming, however, this is not
the case, Libicki 2009 raises the following nine questions for conducting cyber deterrence.
First, is there a reliable way to determine the identity of the attacker (also Moore, 2008)?
Can the methods used to identify the attacker be shared in an international forum to convince
third parties of the attribution? If attribution is not sound, the defender risks running afoul
of international standards on acceptable behavior. There is a wide range of technical methods
available to mask the true origin of an attack, requiring non-technical attribution methods
to play a role. Tracking cyber attackers to their origin requires an unprecedented level of
cooperation between the political, law enforcement, and private sectors of many countries.
Even allies might be unwilling or unable to provide information to help.
Second, does the defender possess sufficient capability to credibly threaten an adversary?
For all the reasons mentioned above, it is extremely difficult to develop a tested offensive
capability and declare it to adversaries. International acceptance is also a potentially high
hurdle, and only treaties between individual nations currently address this topic (Moore, 2008).
Additionally, a counterattack must be palatable for the defender’s stakeholders or the decision
to retaliate could have negative political repercussions for decision-makers (Moore, 2008).
Third, is the ability to retaliate repeatable? Since cyber attacks rely on system vulnera-
bilities, any network administrator should, upon detecting an attack, find and close the hole
that allowed it to succeed. There is also the risk that such vulnerabilities will be discovered
on their own, before an exploit is attempted.
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Fourth, if unable to deter an attacker, can one at least disarm them? Many systems used to
attack might be extremely difficult to disarm or destroy, even by the aggressor (e.g., botnets).
Other systems might not be accessible from the Internet (e.g., supercomputers used for code
breaking) or be dispersed among multiple sets of hardware and geographic locations (e.g.,
content distribution systems such as Google, Amazon, or Akamai).
Fifth, is the fight contained to just the aggressor and defender? There’s a possibility of
involving allies or other parties who would like to see harm come to the defender or attacker
dog pile onto an attack. In such a case, even if the primary aggressor is stopped by retaliation,
other attacks might continue. Of course, this cuts both ways and could serve in itself as a
deterrent. Understanding the cascading effects of a cyber attack would likely be a challenge
even for the designers of many critical systems, not to mention an aggressor with limited access
and intelligence (Moore, 2008).
Sixth, does retaliation send the right message to stakeholders? If the federal government
is responsible for deterring attacks, does that mean that private companies are exempt from
liability in the case of cyber war, a la force majeure? Does the fact that governments reserve
the right to counter cyber attack with cyber attack give private citizens and organizations an
expectation of freedom to do the same?
Seventh, where is the line for retaliation? If the defender states a zero-tolerance policy,
it will consume itself tracking and punishing perpetrators. Cyber warfare is in many ways
the twenty-first century espionage and is a continuous activity by friends and foes alike. A
deterrent threat is only effective if sufficiently severe to make an aggressor think twice. Many
cyber attacks are comparatively small in the scale of belligerence. Criteria such as loss of life
or economic cost gel well with conventional warfare, but are unlikely to directly result from
cyber attacks and are difficult to quantify, respectively. These “lines in the sand” should be
well-defined, but shared only in vague terms for fear of allowing a precisely calibrated attack
(Moore, 2008).
Eighth, in cyber deterrence, unlike nuclear deterrence, there is a concern of escalation. In
nuclear war, a first strike was pretty much as bad as it could get. There really was no way to
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top a nuclear attack. However, in cyber war there is the possibility that an adversary might
respond to cyber retaliation with conventional weapons, economic or political maneuvers, or
even nuclear war. If the labeled aggressors do not believe that retaliation was merited, face
internal pressure to make a point, or think they will benefit from moving the conflict out of
the cyber domain, there is a significant risk of escalation.
Finally, the defender must consider aggressors with little or nothing worthy of cyber retali-
ation. Given that a devastating attack could, in theory, be launched from a single laptop with
a dial-up Internet connection, it follows that retaliation in kind might be no deterrent at all.
The only response could come from conventional kinetic weapons, but at a risk of escalation
or international condemnation.
2.6 Criticality of Attribution
Deterrence only works if the defender makes a credible retaliatory threat. If the attacker
believes his identity will not be discovered by the defender, there can be no retaliation; thus, all
deterrence fails. This is the principal reason that attribution is so important, and why many
say that deterrence in cyberspace is impossible. To date, no sufficient methods of attribution
have surfaced to make any deterrent threat credible. The next chapter will discuss existing
attribution methods.
Of course in a perfect world, attribution might be easier. Take an example of a traditional
crime, a bank robbery. There are many ways investigators might be able to establish the
identify of the robber. Perhaps he left a handwritten note, had a unique voice, did not wear
a mask, drove a getaway car with license plates, carried a unique weapon, or wore unusual
clothing. It would not make much sense for the police to instead try to determine which roads
the robber took to arrive at the bank, and follow them back to his house! Clearly, such an
approach would be fraught with difficulties — unreliable eye witnesses, broken traffic cameras,
open areas with no witnesses, multiple forms of transportation, uncooperative transportation
workers, among others.
It is similarly difficult to try to identify a cyber attack by tracking down the path between
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attacker and target. Poor record-keeping, misconfigured or lack of detection systems, inten-
tional attempts to mask identity, uncooperative network administrators — the list goes on.
Attackers are aware of this and deterrence fails because everyone knows that tracking down an
individual in cyberspace in many cases is simply impossible — and difficult in most cases. For
the reasons mentioned above that defense is difficult, attribution is equally difficult. Perhaps
it is just being approached in the wrong way.
Regardless of how it is accomplished, attribution is critical. Retaliation is risky at best
and counter-productive at worst. Without a clear, confident guess to the identity of the
attacker, this risk is increased. Retaliating against the wrong party is not only embarrassing
and ineffective, it might run afoul of international law. As previously discussed, any actions
after an attack has happened are likely to be difficult and messy for the victim, even if the law
is on their side. It is then most favorable to keep an attack from happening in the first place.
Attribution is the key to doing so.
36
CHAPTER 3. ATTRIBUTION
A number of methods have been developed in an attempt to attribute the source of a cyber
attack. These generally fit into one of several levels at which attribution can take place — the
network level, the traffic level, on individual hosts, and non-technical methods. Each of these
levels can be divided into techniques that can be implemented only if control of all devices in
the path is held and those which are able to suggest an identity with a limited presence. The
following is based upon an analysis of other surveys of attribution methods (Daniels, 2002;
Hunker et al., 2008; Wheeler and Larsen, 2003).
Due to the highly interconnected and dynamic nature of the Internet, the majority of
techniques can only give a high-confidence attribution in the former case. Given the highly
anarchic nature of the Internet, any one organization is unlikely to exert control over all, or
even the majority of it. Therefore, one must be able to obtain information for networks that
belong to others to aid in attribution. As discussed previously, many states might be unwilling
or unable to share such information for a variety of reasons. This implies that significant
resources must be placed into establishing and maintaining presences in unfriendly or hostile
networks if one is to successfully attribute cyber attacks, in general.
3.1 Network-based Attribution
3.1.1 Traffic logging
At the network level, it is necessary to utilize the devices responsible for relaying traffic
between nodes on the Internet to perform attribution. These methods all require some level of
physical access to and control of such devices. The most apparent method is to require network
devices to store logs of all the traffic they handle, including source and destination. An attack
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could then simply be traced link-by-link until the origin is found. Such a tactic would quickly
fill even the largest information storage devices and make identifying individual traffic streams
a computationally hard problem. Take, for example, a 10Mbps half-duplex (one-way) link,
roughly equivalent to a decent home Internet connection and thus a gross underestimate for
the high-traffic, 24x7 operating level 1 routers of the Internet. On such a link at full-capacity,
108GB of data would be generated daily, or a little over 39TB per year. This is equivalent to
27 digital video discs (DVDs) per day (or almost 10,000 per year). ISPs operate links which
can reach 100,000 Mbps, so clearly storing a complete log of all traffic is not feasible.
3.1.2 Summary logging
Storing just the headers of packets is unlikely to solve the problem. A header contains
the source and destination of the packet (ostensibly), as well as parameters which guide the
handling of the packet by intermediate network devices. The information contained in the
header allows traffic prioritization, loop prevention, congestion avoidance, re-sequencing of
packets which arrive out of order, integrity verification, and connection state tracking. The
minimum IPv4 header is 20 bytes (IPv6 headers are at least twice this size) and a typical
transmission unit size is 1500 bytes. Given this ratio, one could expect at most a 98.67% savings
by omitting the payload from archival. However, even in this case the storage requirements
for an ISP monitoring a gigabit link might approach 50TB per year (100TB if full-duplex). At
the time of writing, the largest single drives that can be purchased are in the 2-3TB range. It
is clearly not cost-effective for an ISP to record all traffic.
3.1.3 Probabilistic logging
It has been suggested this problem might be solved by storing only parts of each trans-
mission. Perhaps just the first and last packet, or every n-th packet. While this would cer-
tainly reduce storage requirements, it increases computational requirements. If every packet
is recorded, at least the network device did not need to decide whether or not to record each
packet. On the other hand, to maintain consistent sampling, the device must keep track of
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every ongoing session, how many packets it has seen, and decide whether or not each packet
should be recorded. This will also require additional temporary storage in memory to keep
track of the packet count for all ongoing connections.
3.1.4 Compact logging
Similarly, one might suggest keeping only a hash of each packet in storage. A hash is a
cryptographic function that maps a potentially infinite length input into a fixed length output.
It is often used for integrity checking, because these algorithms (such as the Message Digest
[MD] or Secure Hashing Algorithm [SHA]) are highly sensitive to the input. An ideal hashing
algorithm will change every bit of its output given only a single bit change in the input.
There are limitations to these methods, but a more thorough treatment is beyond the scope
of this analysis. Suffice it to say that one might regard a hashing algorithm as a reliable method
to represent arbitrarily large data elements in a finite space. As such, one might be able to
generate a hash of each packet crossing a network device. An MD5 hash is 128 bits (16 bytes)
and a SHA-1 hash is 160 bits (20 bytes). If one were to record this hash and some information
about the link on which the packet arrived and departed, he might be able to keep a fairly
compact database of all traffic crossing a device.
This has several disadvantages. Like storing only packet headers, even with large savings
in per-packet storage requirements, there is still a potentially large storage requirement unless
the retention period is small. Like sampling, there is a computational requirement to generate
the hash values as packets pass through the network device. This computation is significantly
more difficult than the simple decision based on packet ordering, and will cause an even greater
performance impact.
Finally, another feature of hashing algorithms is that they are one-way functions. That is,
it is easy to use these algorithms to generate a hash value from an input, but to do the reverse
is extremely difficult or impossible. Because of the use of modular arithmetic in most hashing
algorithms, one cannot deterministically identify the input even with an infinite amount of
resources devoted to the problem. It is as though someone says that she has added some
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multiple of seven hours to a previous time and arrived at 1PM. The original time might have
been 6PM, 11AM, 4AM, and so on. No amount of computation will solve this problem as
there are multiple possible answers. The only way to “break” these functions is to iterate
through every possible input and find values that produce the hash value in question and also
look like valid inputs. This method of brute-forcing the input to a hash function is extremely
computationally-intensive, and it is still non-deterministic. Therefore, one could generate the
hash value of an attacker’s packet and submit it to ISPs to look up in a database. The ISPs
would be unable to find related traffic as they would be unable to inspect the content of the
packet to find clues. Even assuming the victim gave them the full packet contents, they would
only be able to make a single leap before coming up with more hashed packets.
3.1.5 Embedded logging
Another suggestion is to embed tracking information directly into packets or the network
traffic streams. This method is employed in electronic mail messages. In the simple mail
transport protocol (SMTP) header, there is something like a chain of custody for the message.
Each device involved in routing the message to the recipient inserts a line in this log with its
name, IP address, and the time the message is received. In this way, one can track the path
of an email message to its original sender. There are several problems using this approach for
broader attribution purposes. First, one must trust that no one has tampered with the header.
It would be trivial for an intermediate party to alter the header to inject or remove hops from
the path. It also assumes the first device in this recorded path is where the sender is actually
“sitting”. That is to say, it assumes the person behind the keyboard and the first device in the
path are equivalent. As a hacker might compromise remote systems (even doing so on large
scales, such as bot-nets) to send messages, this equivalence does not hold.
Finally, this method adds data to the transmission. In the case of email, where speeds are
not generally much of a concern, this doesn’t cause much of a problem. However, many network
applications have very small tolerances for the delay that might be caused by piggybacking
data. Voice over IP (VoIP) is one example. VoIP systems are very carefully engineered to
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provide the amount of throughput needed to sustain the contracted number of telephone calls,
while maintaining high quality. If one introduced the extra data and delay caused by adding
path information to the packet at each hop in the path, the quality of voice calls (or at least
the throughput efficiency) would likely decrease. This would be true whether the tracking data
were injected into the packet or the traffic stream, although the latter case would not require
the delay of rewriting the packet at each hop.
3.1.6 Centralized summary logging
Suppose routers then just generated periodic summaries of traffic they have seen and sent
them to a central logging server for archival. This is the worst of each scenario. This requires
storage on a central logging server in the way that storing the traffic (or samplings of it) does.
It requires additional computational and storage resources on the network devices to keep track
of connections and generate reports. It generates additional load for network links. It also
introduces a whole new problem — where should these messages be sent? Would each ISP
be responsible for maintaining a database? In this case, nothing has been gained from the
current situation. One must still rely on ISPs to collect information properly, and to cooperate
with investigations. Maybe routers send their information to a kind of escrow server where
any party is able to perform investigations. It must then be decided who is trusted to operate
such a system, how access can be controlled while still allowing the necessary access, how to
mesh the laws of various jurisdictions to preserve the legality of the storage and retrieval of
these data, and the not-so-small problem of finding a location capable of accepting incoming
traffic reports from every network device in the world!
3.1.7 Network reconfiguration
A tactic that could potentially prove useful, given enough knowledge of the network topol-
ogy, is that of reconfiguring, or otherwise affecting the network and watching for changes in
the attack. As the events in China during 2010 showed (Hijacking, 2010), this is possible.
Obviously, for electronic Blitzkriegs, there is not much this method can do, as there is insuffi-
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cient time to gather the necessary data. However, for longer term attacks, such as the denial
of service flooding attacks that took out networks in Estonia and Georgia, it might prove
effective.
If a large portion of the path to the attacker is under the defender’s control, specific network
devices or links could be temporarily disabled to determine if they are used in the attack. With
sufficient experiments of this nature and some heavy use of graph theory, a picture of the path
to the attacker might emerge. If the network is not under the defender’s control, techniques
such as controlled flooding could be used to saturate upstream routers to effectively take them
oﬄine or significantly increase their latency. However, this could be viewed as a retaliation
against a neutral party and invite retaliation of its own or international condemnation.
Such methods assume much about the level of control and observational capabilities of the
defender. Perhaps, only a handful of organizations worldwide would be capable of exerting
this level of influence over the structure of the Internet. And it is questionable whether they
have the instrumentation in place to gather the necessary data to make use of this tactic.
3.1.8 Traceback
The most dramatic method is that of a “traceback”. The idea here is the victim of an attack
might be able to realize the attack is occurring, and unroll the path to the attacker link-by-link
until the true network source is revealed. Of course, this “unrolling” might required that the
victim do some hacking of his own. To gain all the information necessary to take another step
toward the attacker, a high-level of access to each node is required. Log data, route data,
open connections, addressing information, which exploit(s) the attacker used to get into the
given node, and whether the node is in fact the true origin — to name a few. Given sufficient
information to track the attack aback to its source, any number of attribution or retaliation
options might become feasible.
This is perhaps the most dramatic scenario and one that is not new to Hollywood. The
idea of a hacker-on-hacker dogfight, where they race to take out each other’s connection before
falling victim, certainly fits well with classical paradigms of how warfare works. But, this all
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assumes events happen in timescales that are comprehensible, let alone actionable, by humans.
While there are likely sequences of events the attacker must complete to fully penetrate a
system, many of these are likely highly scripted or rehearsed, so they can be executed in quick
succession.
The actual break-in most likely consists of exploit code that will run at machine-speed;
that is, billions of instructions per second. It is difficult to imagine a human even handling a
few tens of instructions per second, even if the instructions are clear and straightforward. How
likely is it the victim-turned-attacker will be able to quickly reverse the attack chain with no a
priori knowledge of the affected systems? At each stage he must follow the normal intrusion
steps — footprinting, scanning, enumerating, and exploiting. As any penetration tester (or
hacker) will attest, this process is rife with trial and error and is likely to take weeks or months
on well-secured systems. The idea that the victim will be able to complete this process on
multiple systems in quick succession before the attacker has vanished is a stretch, at best. The
only hope for this method is the development of extensive automated attack tools, such as the
Metasploit framework, which might be able to accomplish these tasks at high speeds. Even
such tools will never be perfect.
Without a complete understanding of all devices traversed, it is also possible that unin-
tended consequences (a la Morris) could wreak havoc on critical systems of allies or other
bystanders, and create a much worse situation than originally existed. The Internet was de-
signed to be highly survivable and maintains the ability to reconfigure itself to ensure the
arrival of traffic. Such a system is called best-effort in that, within the parameters of its
design, it will do everything possible to ensure it meets its design goals.
In the case of the Internet, dynamic route tables and route exchange protocols allow ISPs
to work around unreliable or nonoperational links and devices, and balance the load across
active links to minimize latency (delay) and jitter (variation in delay between packets), while
maximizing throughput. A packet sent between two nodes on the Internet, even in the same
town, might transit any number of ISPs and geographic locations. It might cross submarine
cables, satellite links, underground lines, leased lines, private network exchanges, or any number
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of other autonomous systems (AS). Each of these is potentially a node on the reverse path
to the attacker. If the victim accidentally takes out a large ISPs router while tracing the
connection, she might not only affect the attacker, but also anyone else using that device. This
could mean critical infrastructure, hospitals, private citizens, allies, or any number of other
bystanders. Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, it is nearly impossible to say for
certain (or control) the path one’s traffic will take to its destination. Even U.S. DOD-controlled
networks, like the GIG, likely make use of private relays for the sake of efficiency.
3.2 Traffic-based Attribution
The next class of attribution methods are those based on the modification or analysis of
attack traffic. Certain protocols on the Internet are more spoof-able (easy to fake the origin)
than others. Therefore, where possible, more secure protocols should be used. One example is
that of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) versus the User Datagram Protocol (UDP),
two of the most common protocols for transferring information over the Internet. The former
requires a three-way handshake between sender and receiver, which at least guarantees the
origin is who it says it is (to say nothing of stepping-stone attacks). The latter allows a user to
send traffic to any host on the Internet with no verification of its origin or receipt. Protocols
incorporating cryptographic guarantees of authenticity (such as IPSEC, the security enabled
brother of the Internet Protocol) also make it extremely difficult to hide the origin, but have
additional overhead to establish and process a secure channel.
3.2.1 Attributable sources
A luxury most network administrators do not have is to whitelist traffic coming into their
networks. Instead, most administrators must rely on blacklists. The difference being, the
former case assumes no one is allowed entry, but those explicitly defined. The latter case is the
opposite. For most Internet sites, the goal is to encourage new users to visit the site. These
visitors contribute to the bottom line of the web site, either through conversions to electronic
sales, or indirectly through advertising impressions or “click-throughs” to sponsors.
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In such cases, it it undesirable to require explicit permission granted to each and every
individual wishing to use the site. This is not to say that e-commerce sites do not require
logins; obviously, they do. It is to say that if one wanted to access Amazon.com, he must first
contact Jeff Bezos and request that his computer’s IP address be given access to the site. Only
then could one visit the site and create an account.
Rather, one must open a site to everyone and take retroactive measures to curtail improper
or unauthorized use (i.e., blacklist individuals). This is quite difficult, as the same individual
might hold any number of virtual identities consisting of IP addresses, user names, email
addresses, credit cards, or any other token selected. IP addresses are of special concern since
an attacker might have hundreds or thousands of addresses at her disposal. One cannot simply
block large swaths of address space for fear of locking out legitimate users. This gives the
attacker the upper hand as she can effectively change addresses ad infinitum when detected.
This will be even more the case in IPv6 where the size of the address space grows by 296! So,
in most cases, one can assume a blacklist-based approach is essentially fully open to anyone
who has the means to access it.
Conversely, networks such as military installations, critical infrastructure, and industrial
control systems (e.g., SCADA) might have a very clearly defined set of users. These users
might reside in a small portion of the IP address space (that is to say: out of 4 billion IPv4
addresses, they might all share a small subset). In this case, the whitelist approach might be
suitable. One can ensure that only systems fully secured and accessed by authorized users
are allowed to make use of sensitive resources. The U.S. DOD does this through the use of
the Common Access Card (CAC) each employee carries. The identifying information on this
card gives personnel access to sensitive information and systems, and uniquely ties their cyber
actions to their person. Then,network administrators can configure systems to only allow
access by those systems which support the CAC mechanism, and make use of access control
lists to tightly restrict the flow of information into and out of the system.
One can envision agreements between network providers to make such restrictions work
outside of these tightly-restricted environs, but it is a stretch. Any mention of a national
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identity card or practically any other common access card for U.S. citizens has encountered
stark opposition, due to privacy concerns. It is unlikely that any CAC equivalent for the
general populace will exist in the near future. Even if it did, one would have to limit visitors
to domestic addresses (if possible) until international agreement about the forms and exchange
of identification information is reached. A virtual passport is simply not on the horizon.
There are some areas where this line of thinking might bear fruit, however. For example, e-
mail servers can support the Sender Policy Framework (SPF), which verifies that the sender of
a message is actually authorized to send mail for a given domain. If an unauthorized user wants
to send a message from secure.com, but secure.com has set up SPF, the receiving server will
see the message did not come from the authorized secure.com mail server and have the option
to reject it. This is an example of a fully decentralized and easily configurable mechanism to
reduce identify forgery in cyberspace. However, it must be coupled with a list of email service
providers known to have attribution-friendly policies to be of the greatest use.
Network administrators can also reduce traffic forgery by configuring network devices and
servers to intelligently watch incoming traffic. If traffic arrives on an interface that has no
path to the network address the traffic claims, it is likely that the traffic was spoofed (sender
address forged) as part of an attack, or at least a reconnaissance attempt. Due to the route
exchange protocols on the Internet, and a number of special subnets defined in IPv4 and IPv6
(used mainly for private networks, non-routed networks, and research networks), this is fairly
trivial to achieve. However, like SPF, this monitoring only helps to ensure that a sender does
not forge his identity. It does not guarantee the sender is coming from an attributable network.
3.2.2 Watermarking
A more subtle way of tracking traffic has been suggested — that of traffic watermarking.
Unlike watermarks on financial documents or letters, these watermarks are inserted into the
network traffic stream. This discussion will place aside the use of steganographic watermarks
(i.e., embedding information within the payload in cryptographically secure and hard to detect
ways), since their use is probably not feasible in the high-speed environment of real-time Inter-
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net traffic. The idea is to subtly alter the timing between subsequent packets (the inter-arrival
time, IAT) in a detectable way. However, “detectable” is based on perspective. The alteration
must be significant enough to rise above normal variations in timing, due to congestion, but
minor enough to not draw the attacker’s attention to the fact that he is being monitored. This
is easier in bulk-transfer applications, such as web browsing or file transfers, but much more
difficult in time-sensitive applications, such as interactive login sessions, VoIP, or multimedia
streaming. The more time-sensitive the communication, the more likely an attacker will notice
something is out of the ordinary. This is to say nothing of systems which might specifically be
looking for such watermarks.
So the watermark must be very subtle. But, at some point it will no longer survive the
jitter added by normal network data transmission, requiring detection to rely on statistical
measures to detect partial watermarks. This surely will become messy very quickly.
Additionally, all of this assumes that the observer is able to position herself in such a way to
both modify the traffic sent at the destination, and monitor the traffic along intermediate and
destination devices. If one already has this amount of control over the network, the additional
value of watermarking is questionable. There are still applications for encrypted traffic, where
one cannot readily observe the payload, but even encrypted packets have a header in plain
text, so they can be routed.
If one wishes to hide this information, she must use a system such as Tor, which will
accept fully encrypted packets destined for its otherwise benign network address and relay
them through a secure network to their destination. In such cases, the intermediate nodes
will “re-packetize” the traffic and destroy the watermark anyway! Along the same vein, if the
attacker uses any intermediate stepping stones in the attack, there is a possibility this will also
corrupt the watermark during retransmission.
A technique exists that has been found to break the anonymity of Tor-like systems (Math-
ewson and Dingledine, 2005; Murdoch and Zielinski, 2007). If the defender can observe both
the ingress and egress points for a given stream, it is possible to associate patterns of traffic by
headers, throughput, or timing to make guesses as to the source and destination of a stream
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of traffic. It is very difficult for a user of these systems to circumvent this technique, as one
typically exerts little control over the encrypted “circuit” his traffic uses - even if this is an
option. But, it is also difficult for an attacker to control enough nodes to have a good chance
of observing both the entrance and exit of traffic through the network. Perhaps, this might
all be beside the point, as the latency introduced by these systems is so high it makes them
unusable for most interactive connections.
Additionally, watermarking can occur by modifying the packet. Known modifications can
be made to traffic along the path between the attacker and the victim. A defender then uses
network devices in various locations along potential paths to watch for these modifications.
For example, a unique string could be inserted into the return packets of any connection
triggering an alert on an intrusion detection device. If this string is detected elsewhere on the
network, it can be said with some certainty that a malicious user might be at or near that
location. However, this requires coordination in advance of resources and a great deal of luck
with placement of sensors. The question again arises - if the traffic near the attacker can be
monitored for the watermark, why can the defender not just monitor for the attack?
3.2.3 Self-identification
It is also possible an attacker is careless about the information she conveys to the victim.
Basically, this is a degenerate case of attribution. Perhaps the attacker fails to mask the source
IP address of the attack or sends a phishing email from his personal email account. In such
cases attribution is very easy, but there are other subtle forms of self-identification, or at least
providing information that can aid attribution.
Any phishing scam’s intent is to get the user to take some action to reveal otherwise
privileged information. This is necessarily a two-way communication with the attacker. The
user might be tricked into visiting a fake bank website, running a script that calls back to a
server under the attacker’s control, asked to email or telephone her password to the attacker.
In every case, there is a trail to the attacker, and the question becomes how well the attacker
hid that trail. Unfortunately, in many cases the answer is very well.
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It is trivial to set up email accounts and phone numbers using free services, such as Google
Mail and Google Voice, that can be simply impossible to tie to an individual or organization.
Hackers frequently make use of compromised machines or machines in jurisdictions which will
mask their true identities as bases for their attacks. They might string together a number of
compromised systems to hedge their bets, or even trick bystanders into performing the attack
for them!
In less obvious ways, information contained in the network connection exchange might shed
light on the attacker’s identity or affiliation. For example, whenever visiting a website, the
user leaves behind a kind of fingerprint containing information about his system known as the
“user-agent” string. For example:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-U.S.; rv:1.9.0.1) Gecko/2008070208 Firefox/3.0.1
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/125.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/125.8
Links (2.1pre15; FreeBSD 5.3-RELEASE i386; 196x84)
Googlebot/2.1 (+http://www.googlebot.com/bot.html)
In each case, some information is revealed about the end user. With the exception of the
last entry, these examples would unlikely provide sufficient information about the user to lead
to an attribution. However, suppose one came upon a user-agent string that contained “Red
Flag Linux” (the Chinese Linux distribution), or non-English words, or even custom strings
resulting from customized browsers or operating systems. In these cases, this information
might help.
This example is somewhat elementary, but the concept, in general, still applies. Network
administrators make use of operating system fingerprinting with scanning tools, such as Nmap,
to determine software running on remote systems. This is based on the fact that certain
operating systems respond to network traffic in particular ways. This might be an unusual
sequence of flag settings, timings, packet sizes, or other protocol-level features. Older operating
systems might change sequence numbers in network packets in semi-predictable ways.
So in subtle or not-so-subtle ways, attackers might reveal more about themselves than
they realize. These techniques are highly operating system, application, and perhaps attacker-
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dependent, however. One would need to be aware of peculiarities that might be exhibited in all
of these different situations and with which individuals or groups they are affiliated. Because of
the large degree of homogeneity of hardware, software, and networking protocols, it is unlikely
that information gleaned in this way would be sufficient to pin down an individual. Still, it is
another tool in the box.
3.3 Host-based Attribution
A natural progression, based on the many difficulties of network-based attribution, is host-
based attribution. Unlike network-based techniques, host-based techniques operate in a much
less volatile and unpredictable playing field. In many cases the same types of information
might be obtained, but the method is different.
3.3.1 Caveats
The main advantage of host-based attribution is it is easy to access target devices. It
might also be easier to covertly load special purpose software onto, say, a console in an Iranian
Internet cafe than onto a network device belonging to an ISP. The latter case is likely to
be fraught with much peril — legal, political, and technical. As mentioned previously, a
poorly planned modification to a network device could have far-reaching effects on innocent
bystanders. It is also much more difficult to obtain the legal authorization and cooperation
of an ISP. Conversely, relatively little harm is likely to come from making changes to a single
system (unless that system serves a critical purpose). Defense software can be applied only
to those devices at risk. Offensive implants can be inserted only into devices that present a
threat. This has the potential to significantly increase the signal-to-noise ratio of information
gathered for analysis.
On the other hand, to maintain such an extensive presence is to make several assumptions.
Primarily, one must have some idea of where an attack might originate or terminate to ensure
the correct systems are instrumented ahead of time or inspected after-the-fact. Doing so
represents a potentially significant investment of time, money, service downtime, and perhaps
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even political capital and legal risk-taking. Because of these costs, one would wish to specifically
target as few hosts as possible with implants or forensics. One could argue that one must have a
fairly well-defined idea of where the attack came from to target host-based attribution methods.
This is to say, as with watermarking, these methods provide little marginal value.
3.3.2 Local host analysis
Setting aside this caveat, the discussion returns to methods which can be used to obtain
information from hosts to aid in attribution. The easiest are forensic methods applied to one’s
own systems. This could be log file analysis, file system forensics, intrusion detection alerts,
or analyzing exploit code that has been left behind. All of these methods bypass the legal and
political constraints that might arise outside of one’s own network. However, there is a limit
to the value obtained from them.
Log file analysis and intrusion network alerts, like many of the network-based forensics,
only reveal a link in the chain (unless the attacker was highly careless). An in this case, it is
only the very first link in the chain. Still, information from these might be used as part of a
broader profile of the attack, a topic which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Similarly, analysis of any remnants the attacker left behind might help to build a profile
of the attacker. But again, these are not likely to be of much use on their own. Unless the
attacker used very unique tools or methods, which might identify him or his affiliation, one
has only information to use for comparison with other attacks.
One might choose to construct honeypots — systems whose only purpose is to invite at-
tack. These systems can be specially instrumented to gather additional information about the
attacker that a normal system might not collect. Perhaps additional details about the network
connection characteristics could be recorded, records of all system calls could be sent to a
secure archival system, the file system could use a “tripwire” system to watch for any changes
made by an attacker. All of these things can help shed additional light on the activity of the
attacker, but are still mostly limited to building a profile.
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3.3.3 Remote host analysis
Often, systems are already instrumented to allow their administrators to monitor their
health and status. If a defender has some idea of where an attack is originating, but needs to
gather additional information, she might be able to query a host directly for more information.
For example, many systems make use of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
to make information about running processes, available resources, logged in users, or other
system stats available to a central monitoring system. If these are not properly secured (or
the security can be bypassed), this might help to jump to the next link in the attack chain, or
verify the origination point of an attack.
Comparable to the traceback mentioned above is a “hackback”, where the defender directly
exploits a system being used to attack. Of course the same limitations exist as with network-
tracebacks. Assuming, however, that this method is feasible, one might be able to implant
software onto an attacker’s system (or an intermediate node in a stepping stone attack) that
will deliver additional information about the attack and attacker.
Unfortunately, maintaining a presence on remote hosts is probably the most labor intensive
method of attribution. One needs either a highly-specific target or a very large net. A very large
net comes with the reality that systems are routinely patched, moved, reinstalled, upgraded,
discarded, bought, sold, and so on. One cannot simply deploy a large number of implants and
be done with it. It is an ongoing task to monitor the health and viability of implants already
“in-the-field” and restore functionality when necessary. If software vendors are doing their
jobs, this will become more difficult with each new release of an application. And, of course,
all of this must be done in such a way as to evade detection.
Viruses and root-kits have become quite good at this task, but this is likely only because of
their abundance (call it natural selection). Malware protection software is constantly evolving
to detect such malicious modifications to systems. The irony of the situation is that all of
the effort put into making one’s own systems more secure might very well be used by the
adversary to make it more difficult to penetrate their systems. For example, one might be
diligent about submitting new threats to an anti-virus vendor to ensure that his protection is
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the most robust it can be. There is a good chance, however, that the adversary might be using
the same anti-virus software! By helping the anti-virus vendor, one potentially also aids the
enemy.
3.4 Non-technical Attribution
All of the above methodsrequire some level of access to the devices used for an attack, which
can prove difficult when confronting a well-informed adversary or when making requests to un-
cooperative third parties. It is worth mentioning that there is a long precedent of non-technical
intelligence gathering going back millenia. By working in concert with law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, such traditional trade craft might be employed to aid attribution.
If there is evidence an individual or group is planning or executing an attack, it might
pay to observe them or gather further information about their activities. This could mean
any number of traditional espionage techniques, as well as twenty-first century techniques
such as intercepting e-mail [mail], installing keystroke recorders [wiretapping], or monitoring
via electromagnetic radiation [eavesdropping]. It has been confirmed that even recording the
sound of a person typing on a keyboard can reveal what is entered (Zhuang et al., 2009) and
the contents of a cathode ray tube monitor can be read at a distance with specialized receiving
equipment (Kuhn, 2003).
It is outside the scope of this work to enumerate the many ways that attribution in the
cyber domain might be aided by tactics outside it. Many other options exist to determine the
source of an attack, which do not rely on any of the cyber-techniques mentioned previously.
However, such tactics are likely very difficult to employ even for governmental agencies, and
most of them are simply out of the realm of possibility for other defenders. It is also potentially
more difficult to integrate information collected in these ways with the fast-paced and highly-
dynamic stream of information coming from cyber attribution methods.
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3.5 Need for New Attribution Strategies
From the previous discussion it should be clear that none of the existing attribution methods
are well-suited for all cases and many of them are unlikely to be useful in more than a few
cases. There are simply too many ways for an attacker to befuddle attempts at learning his
identity. The assumptions of current attribution methods fall into the categories of omniscience,
omnipresence, or a priori positioning. Each of these is an unreasonable assumption and, thus,
a new method needs developed, which does not make them. A summary is shown in Table 3.1.
Many methods assume that one can obtain information from all, or at least a significant
portion of, the nodes between attacker and victim. This is the assumption of omniscience, that
a defender (or attributor) can obtain much of the information necessary to analyze the path of
the attack and determine its origin. Network-based attribution assumes that one can obtain
information about the traffic flowing through nodes on the network. Traffic-based methods
assume one can observe traffic at various points along the network. Host-based assumes one
knows where to target surgical attribution efforts and that the information pulled out will
be sufficient to aid attribution. In the highly decentralized world of cyber space, one cannot
assume knowledge of any traffic beyond her own network borders. This is to say that any
general-purpose attribution technique must be able to function with knowledge only of traffic,
devices, and users of the victimized network, and nothing beyond.
Second, many of the techniques require software agents in place at strategic points along
a network path. Whether this is in network devices through which traffic will pass, entry and
exit nodes of anonymization networks, systems in proximity to the origin of the attack, or
elsewhere. In the worst case, this requires constant “care and feeding” of a large number of
software agents throughout both friendly and hostile networks (and everything in between).
It is pure luck, if agents are in the right place at the right time. Perhaps luck is too harsh.
But, in the exception of highly targeted agent installations, one must rely on large numbers of
agents to increase the chances of gathering sufficient information for attribution. In the best
case, where it is both technically and legally feasible to place an agent at such locations, the
speed of doing so means that by the time the agent is in place, the attack might have already
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Table 3.1 Attribution Assumptions, Old and New
Old Assumption New Assumption
Omniscience Knowledge only of events within one’s own network
Omnipresence Deployment of agents only within one’s own network
A Priori Positioning Must rely on budget-constrained agents deployed in likely attack locations
subsided. More discussion on this will follow. In general, one cannot assume the placement of
software agents in any network that is not directly controlled by the defender.
Finally, the best attribution methods and positioning in the world are of no use, if they are
not deployed in time to observe the attack. Perhaps forensic examination of network device
logs might be an exception, but in most cases the level of detail held in these logs (if they are
even enabled) is not sufficient for attribution purposes. The same can be said for host logs.
Therefore, if one requires a software agent or network device observe the attack taking place,
he must also assume this tool must be in place at the latest when the attack begins. This
assumption of a priori positioning means, if the assumption of omnipresence does not hold, it
must be known ahead of time where to place a limited number of agents.
What is needed then is an attribution method which relies solely on information that can
be observed directly by the victim. This still makes a critical assumption— the victim is
prepared ahead of time with whatever logging or forensic capabilities required for attribution.
This is a much more reasonable assumption than the three previous methods. The limits to
this assumption are merely the education, financing, and discipline of the defender. There are
no legal, political, or technical barriers to implementing these methods on one’s own network.
However, to say that one must be able to identify the perpetrator of an attack, based only
on what can be seen at the target site, seems like quite a stretch! While there is obviously
no way to obtain a deterministic individual identity, based on such information, it might be
possible to at least say that two attacks were perpetrated by the same attacker. As it turns
out, such research is already quite commonplace in literary analysis and intellectual property
disputes.
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CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS A CYBERPRINT
To avoid the assumptions in Table 3.1 is to throw out nearly all attribution methods
suggested to date. However, there is a distinction in the attribution method that will be
proposed here. While many existing methods of attribution are concerned with tracking down
the person behind the keyboard (or at least the organization driving that person), Cyberprints
take a broader view. This new method begins with the assumption that there is some existing
knowledge, defined outside the scope of this work, about the origin of past attacks. How this
information is obtained could be through any of the attribution methods above (though as
demonstrated, this is unlikely to yield much success) or through political, espionage, or open
source intelligence channels.
Therefore, it is somewhat unfair to directly compare Cyberprinting to all of the methods
above, but it might have advantages which they lack. It is often the case that the true origin
of a past attack or series of attacks is known with some certainty through non-cyber means.
Therfore, it might be desirable to compare a recent or ongoing attack to what is known about
past attacks and try to determine if it matches the characteristics of an attack of “known”
origin. The question then is how one might perform this comparison.
Cyber attacks vary widely among a large number of dimensions. However, there remains
the possibility that certain attackers or groups of them portray some detectable profile. While
this profile might be hard to define, it should be detectable through statistical methods if it
exists. The digital and highly-quantitative nature of network communications lends itself well
to such analyses. Then the question is what method of analysis might detect such a profile
and what features of an attack are reliable enough to form a profile?
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4.1 Stylometry
A similar problem is had in literature. Often documents of unknown or disputed origin are
in need of analysis to determine their author. Like cyber attacks, there simply might not be
any way to follow a chain of events to the original author. Also like cyber attacks, it might
be the case that a work is suspected of being written by an author who has other works of
authenticated origin. A sub-field in literature studies has developed around these parameters,
that of Stylometry.
Stylometry is a technique, based in literary stylistics, used to ascertain or verify the author-
ship of written documents. It is based on the assumption that an author has a particular set
of writing habits that he is unable to alter without conscious effort (Corney et al., 2001). This
set of features has become known as a writeprint (Abbasi and Chen, 2008; Li et al., 2006),
analogous to a fingerprint in biometrics. In the same way a biometric feature is inherent,
difficult to alter, and expresses itself without the intent of its carrier; a writeprint is something
of a psychological (or behavioral) biometric. This technique has been used in a large number
of studies for such tasks as determining if Sir Francis Bacon actually wrote the plays of Shake-
speare, determining the author of the Federalist Papers, or determining shared authorship of
portions of religious texts.
One of the largest challenges in performing this type of analysis is to select an appropriate
set of features to analyze. The trick is to select enough appropriate, diverse features to capture
the writeprint of an author, without overburdening the analysis. Choosing too many features
will increase the computational requirements for the analysis (the “curse of dimensionality”)
(Kira and Rendell, 1992; Li et al., 2006) and also introduce noise (Kira and Rendell, 1992).
This noise will make it more difficult for any method of analysis to tease out the writeprint
from the natural variance in the writing style, or even counteract the identifying features and
detract from the analysis (Caruana and Freitag, 1994).
Which features, or style markers, can then be used for analysis of texts? Li et al. (2006)
suggest these features can be separated into four categories: 1) lexical features, 2) syntactic
features, 3) structural features, and 4) content-specific features.
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Lexical features are those based upon the usage of language in the text. This represents
measures such as the vocabulary distribution (Yule’s K) and variety (Simpson’s D) (Baayen
et al., 1996; Corney et al., 2001; Hayes, 2008; Holmes, 1994), word length distribution (Holmes,
1994), or words only used once (hapax legomena) and words only used twice (hapax dislegom-
ena) (Corney et al., 2001; Holmes, 1994). Such measures are highly dependent upon the
context of the writing.
Syntactic features are attractive because they represent the way an author constructs her
writing, regardless of the context. The function word usage (common adverbs, auxiliary verbs,
conjunctions, determiners, numbers, prepositions, and pronouns) (Corney et al., 2001; Hayes,
2008; Holmes, 1994; Li et al., 2006), letter frequencies, n-gram (series of n letters or words)
frequencies (Corney et al., 2001), and the usage of punctuation, such as commas, exclamation
points, question marks, or semicolons (Li et al., 2006) could be used.
Structural features, similar to syntactic features, do not have much dependence upon con-
text. These represent the way an author constructs the language of a document, such as distri-
bution of syllables per word, word length distribution, word collocations (words frequently used
together), sentence length, preferred word positions, prepositional phrase structure, distribu-
tion of parts of speech (Corney et al., 2001; Holmes, 1994), sentence length, parts of speech,
syllables per word, or frequencies of i-syllabled words (Holmes, 1994).
Content-specific features are those which vary greatly, depending upon context. For exam-
ple, one would expect lots of references to money (or perhaps “greenbacks”, “dough”, “moola”,
or some other name) in communications discussing a bank robbery, but not in a communica-
tion discussing a chemistry assignment. Words which have a high frequency (Baayen et al.,
1996) in a particular communication might reveal its purpose, if not author.
In all of these categories, mistakes made by the author can be revealing. Grammatical
mistakes, such as sentence fragments, run-on sentences, spelling mistakes (single consonant
instead of double, double consonant instead of single, confused letters, wrong vowel, repeated
letter, only one of doubled letter, letter inversion, inserted letter), abbreviations, all capital
letters, and repeated non alphanumeric characters, all can aid in analysis (Koppel and Schler,
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2003). However, any editing of the communication (proofreading, spell-checking, etc.) can
mask these features. Therefore, Rudman’s Law says the closest text to the original author’s
writing should be used for analysis (Juola and Baayen, 2005).
There is an entire set of features outside of the verbiage itself. At least as far back as
1910, there were studies into the physical properties of documents and what they might reveal
about the author (Osborn, 1910). Handwriting analysis is perhaps the most commonly used;
in fact, the veracity of even contemporary legal documents depends upon the ability to detect
counterfeit signatures. However, other features, such as the type of paper or ink, font choices
(if typed), margins, or the method of publication, might reflect something about the author.
All of these things are less likely to be consistent between a variety of documents from the
same author. While a writer’s writing habits are subconcious and robust to change, these
higher-level features are likely to be context-dependent.
4.2 Software Forensic Analysis
A natural extension of Stylometry is the analysis of software. After all, software is in many
ways just another form of literature. Like prose, it must follow a set of rules regarding its
construction. Yet, it also allows for a degree of freedom in the particular way in which each
programmer implements the same logic. Like poets, many programmers take great pride in
expressing the logic required to accomplish a task in the most elegant way possible. Therefore,
even simple tasks can be expressed in a number of different ways. For these reasons, many of
the same analysis methods might be applied.
The theft of intellectual property, whether it be a term paper or trade secret, has become a
major issue as the ease of transferring data quickly and with perfect fidelity has increased. This
has led to a great deal of effort in translating work in Stylometry to the domain of software
analysis. Additionally, the continued spread of malware, such as viruses and trojans, provides
a large incentive to security product vendors to identify the origin of a piece of code and make
a determination about its trustworthiness.
Some literary features have a direct application or analog in software analysis: choice of
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language, word frequency, line length, typos, or punctuation, for example. Many obviously do
not apply, since software source code and machine code are not intended to be read at length
by humans. However, software adds a host of its own identifying features.
A degenerate case is the analysis of comments in source code or debugging symbols in
machine code (human-readable content left in the final executable to aid in troubleshooting
misbehaving software). These might be analyzed with the exact same methods used in literary
analysis. However, on their own they are unlikely to provide sufficient information for an
attribution, due to their relative scarcity and brevity.
One might also make use of the choice of data structure types in a piece of software. In a
complex language, such as C++, a set of related data might be represented by an array, linked
list, struct, or vector. While there are operational factors to consider when determining which
of these to use, for many cases they can be used interchangeably by the programmer (as long
as he is consistent!). The choice of one over the other might simply be a matter of preference
or the type of training the programmer received. In such cases, it is likely this choice will be
consistent across many pieces of software written by the same individual.
In the same way, the choice of algorithms could be revealing. To sort a list of elements,
there are a multitude of algorithms available. Some are generally accepted as being more
efficient for a given task or list size, but there are still many ways to achieve this task. Again,
the choice is indicative of the background of the programmer. This same profile might emerge
in the choice of system calls, operators, and functions used by the programmer (Hayes, 2008).
A quick way to summarize the programming style of an individual is often of interest.
Primarily, the more complex the software, the more likely it will be prone to bugs. For
this reason, there are a number of complexity metrics (Oman and Cook, 1989) that analyze
code to draw attention to areas that should be reviewed in more detail. For example, the
Cyclomatic Complexity (developed by Thomas J. McCabe, Sr. in 1976) measures how much
of the code is written in ways that cause it to repeat the same instructions, versus maintaining a
purely linear execution path. One might also measure the number of simultaneously executing
instructions (i.e., the degree to which the program is parallelized), as interactions between
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multiple software agents are more prone to race conditions, resource contention, or other hard-
to-diagnose defects. All of these are designed to draw attention to potential problem spots in
the code, but also represent a potential feature.
One large difference between literature and software is that professional software engineers
are likely to make use of coding standards and templates. Coding standards and templates are
usually policies of an organization, with which all of their programmers must comply. They
dictate the style and mechanisms that should be used in the code, to maintain consistency
within a team of programmers. This can serve to mask many of the profile features mentioned
above. Additionally, the rules of syntax in source code tend to be much more strict than those
of literature and, thus, simple programs are less likely to display unique characteristics than
literary works. The “Consistent Programmer Hypothesis” (Hayes, 2008) posits this cuts both
ways. Programmers must write code that functions within the rules of the language, which
will eliminate some of the profile diversity. This also means that their own style is likely to be
highly consistent.
4.2.1 Electronic communications
Somewhere in between traditional communications and programs are electronic communi-
cations. These often can be analyzed in much the same way as traditional communications,
but have some important differences. One potential problem when applying stylometric tech-
niques to these is that of size. Typically, literary analysis is performed on thousands or tens-
of-thousands of words. Like source code, electronic communications, such as forum postings,
chat room logs, e-mails, or instant message transcripts, might only consist of tens or hundreds
of words (Corney et al., 2001). This small sample size makes statistical classification much
more difficult.
On the other hand, in addition to literary features, electronic communications might also
have some of the features of source code. They might contain things like server or network
path information in a header, IP addresses, or formatting syntax. They might also contain
unique literary features, such as greeting and farewell texts, signature blocks (Corney et al.,
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2001), attachments, screen names, or emoticons. These might be used consistently (or even
automatically) and provide additional stability to statistical analysis.
Electronic communications are also unlikely to be edited by the author or anyone else.
This provides a very direct representation of the author’s style (Koppel and Schler, 2003).
However, all these additional features and potential added stability might simply be overcome
by the lack of richness in the data set. This issue of stability versus sensitivity is one that will
constitute a major metric of any analysis method and Cyberprints are certainly no different.
4.3 Stability and Sensitivity
A Cyberprint should comprise a metric that reflects the methods, systems, tools, or in-
frastructure of an attacker. Attackers are unlikely to develop entirely new tools, build new
systems, or set up new bases of operations for each and every attack. Therefore, while their
profile might evolve over time, it stands to reason that commonalities in their technique hold
the potential for an unintentional and unalterable profile. However, questions remain about
which features fit this description. Before this topic is addressed, a more fundamental issue
must be addressed. As potential features are analyzed, one of the key questions will be whether
the feature is consistent for a given attacker across attacks, but unique enough that it is likely
to vary between attackers. A Cyberprint must be stable in that it should have a fair chance of
recognizing the same attacker in different scenarios, but sensitive enough to discern between
different attackers.
4.3.1 Consistency and variance of features
This is the primary challenge of this undertaking. Investigations must be made into various
potential features to determine where they fall in this balance. It is difficult to known a priori
where many features will fall in the spectrum of consistency. This is largely due to a large
variety of potential sources of variation. For the purposes of this work, the scope of features
will be defined as anything which would be collected by a network traffic capturing device at
the site of the target.
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A full enumeration of potential features in this scope will be provided in the following
section. It is, however, worth listing some sources of variance at this level before going forward.
Since these features must all be observable by a network traffic capturing device, it follows
they will all be based upon data contained within these network packets. The scope is further
constrained to the most common protocols on the Internet, TCP/IP and UDP/IP. A typical
deconstruction of network traffic follows along the lines in Table 4.1. In this, the OSI model,
data are classified by the level of encapsulation they have undergone.
Encapsulation is the successive process of “wrapping” an item of data into another item
of data so they can be handled properly. For example, a packet from a web server to a web
browser contains data representing the body of the web page. If it is encrypted, this must
first be completed, and the results placed inside a special packet so the receiver knows to
decrypt the packet before trying to read it. At this step, the contents of the web page are not
important, and so these data can be ignored by the software performing the encryption. It is
said the upper level data has been encapsulated by the lower-level agent.
As the transmission traverses down the levels of the OSI model, it will be encapsulated
a number of times, each time information required at that level is added to the packet, and
the newly encapsulated information becomes irrelevant (save for more strict screening, such
as deep-inspection firewalls or IDSs). At the lowest layer, the data have been completely
encapsulated and become merely a series of physical representations for zeroes and ones. At the
receiving side of the communication, this entire process is reversed. The data are successively
unwrapped and the encapsulation removed until it reaches the web browser, and the contents
of the web page are available for display.
At the lowest layer, the physical layer, variation is in the form of unique attributes of the
transmitting devices. Such features are detectable by idiosyncrasies in the physical construction
of devices and link mediums. Some work at Iowa State University (Daniels et al., 2005; Gerdes
et al., 2006; Jackson, 2006) has shown that fingerprinting of devices at this layer is possible,
implying a significant variance at this level.
At the data link level, the unit of analysis is the frame. A frame consists of a single packet
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Table 4.1 Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model
Data Unit Layer Function
Data Application Communication between client and
server, or any two other application
endpoints.
Presentation Any function required to trans-
form data into application-readable
form (e.g., decryption, endian-
conversion).
Session Inter-host communication.
Segments Transport End-to-end connections.
Packet/Datagram Network Path determination and logical
addressing.
Frame Data Link Physical addressing.
Bit Physical Transmission of data over medium
(e.g., optical, electrical, radio).
of transmitted data on the wire (and thus, the terms “frame” and “packet” will be used inter-
changeably). While bits, represented by voltage differentials, light pulses, or electromagnetic
modulations might be thought of as the atomic unit of transmission, packets are the molecules
resulting from the combinations of these bits. Like molecules, it normally takes many pack-
ets to make anything useful, so most transmissions consist of a series of packets. The most
common data link-layer protocol is Ethernet (IEEE 802.3). Other, largely extinct protocols
include Token Ring (IEEE 802.5), LocalTalk, or serial connections.
In addition to Ethernet, some common data link protocols currently in use include IEEE
802.11 (henceforth, referred to simply as “wireless”), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM),
Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), Point-to-Point Protocol (RFC 1661 - PPP), or the
Fiber Distributed Data Interface (ANSI X3T9.5 - FDDI). Of these, the only protocol of par-
ticular interest for Cyberprints, other than Ethernet, is wireless. The others are used primarily
for wide-area network (WAN) connections between ISP nodes, or for localized storage network
connections. In both Ethernet and 802.11 there are a number of fields that must appear to
ensure correct delivery of the frame. Any of these might constitute features.
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At the next level, network protocols, such as IPv4, IPv6, the Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP), or the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) are used. These are responsible for
creating logical circuits between two nodes on a network or inter-network (hence, Internet).
In the former case, at least in simple networks, this might be little different path-wise than
transmissions at the data link layer. However, the addresses used at the transport level are all
routable. That is, all network devices must be able to recognize these addresses and make a
determination as to where (if anywhere) they should be forwarded to progress closer to their
destination. Certain addresses are recognized as “non-routable” by the standards, used for
things such as local networks that need no allocation approval or automatically configured
networks. However, the non-routing of such packets is a matter of policy (often implemented
in the networking software), not protocol.
As with data link packets, the data required to properly handle a network level packet
contain a number of features which might be useful in attribution. Some of these might only
be useful in generating statistics about a stream, some might be useful in and of themselves.
Variety at this layer comes from the different ways in which operating systems developers
choose to implement network protocol standards. While that might sound counter-intuitive,
there is a large amount of gray area in the standards which can vary from implementation-
to-implementation without affecting the success of communications. This will remain true, at
least from this layer up, and might also be the case to a lesser extent at lower layers.
The session layer, attribution-wise, will be very similar in variability to the network layer.
Session protocols, such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol
(UDP), or AppleTalk, are used. TCP, by and large, dominates traffic on the Internet. It is a
protocol designed to establish a reliable session between two hosts, and is capable of tolerating
network congestion, delays, and outages. UDP, conversely, is a very simple session protocol
that is simply “best effort”. UDP will send a packet to the destination, and assume it got
there. If something happens along the way, there will be no indication that a retransmission
is required. AppleTalk is largely extinct, but it served a similar purpose.
TCP, a complex protocol, is potentially fruitful for attribution. TCP must manage things
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such as re-sequencing packets received out of order, controlling the rate of flow of traffic to
comply with the realities of the transmission channel, re-sending packets not acknowledged as
received, and termination of idle sessions. In each of these areas is a degree of variability that
might vary from attacker-to-attacker, especially when unique or custom systems are used.
Finally, the presentation and application layers are both likely to vary a great deal, de-
pending upon which applications are used. The choice of attack method or target profile might
dictate the use of certain software applications used by the attacker. Such applications might
have detectable signatures created by the way in which they are constructed and executed, or
information which they include in transmissions. This is perhaps the richest area of variation,
but also likely the most difficult to pin down.
4.3.2 Number of features
It would be easy to believe that simply throwing all possible features into the pot, stirring,
and pulling out an attribution might be the easiest and most fruitful way to accomplish the
task at hand. However, it is likely that doing so would, in fact, undermine the ability of
any algorithm to make successful identifications. Of primary concern is the fact that with
increasing numbers of features comes exponentially increasing computational effort. It is not
unacceptable to require significant computational resources, but any additional effort required
should be justified by its contribution to the accuracy of the output. This leads to a requirement
of parsimony in the selection of features. It should be the case that the features selected for use
in Cyberprints are the maximum in a set of asymptotically diminishing contributions. Those
features with little additional value should be discarded.
Figure 4.1 illustrates this point. In this hypothetical distribution, the explanatory variables
have a continuous and monotonic distribution of contributions to the dependent variable. Real
distributions are unlikely to be so clearly defined. In this example, explanatory variables are
sorted in decreasing order of contribution along the horizontal axis, with the magnitude of
their contribution along the vertical axis. To the left of the shaded region are variables which
have a high contribution to the dependent variable. To the right are those which have little
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or no contribution. Inside the shaded region is an area of decreasing explanatory power and
somewhere within this area a delineation should be made between “useful” and “not useful”
explanatory variables. All variables to the right of this delineation should be discarded.
Figure 4.1 Theoretical Explanatory Variable Contributions
All features are given equal weight in the attribution algorithm. In the worst case, the
selection of the wrong features could actually damage the attribution process by making it
more difficult to separate actual identifying patterns from noise. For example, there could be a
set of data in which one feature is a highly reliable indicator of the identify of an attacker, but a
large number of others contain little or no attribution value. The relative contribution of this
reliable indicator will be diminished, perhaps below the threshold of statistical significance.
Thus, it is important to select features that are demonstrably reliable indicators and discard
those unlikely or empirically shown to have little or no value.
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4.3.3 Outlier sensitivity
Network traffic-based features are likely prone to occasional extreme values, due to all the
potential sources of variation. Perhaps there was a momentary network glitch, which caused
additional delay in traffic delivery, or the attacker’s machine was momentarily heavily loaded.
Maybe the attacker normally uses computer A for her attacks, but on one or two occasions
needed to use computer B. For this reason, it is important that the selection of algorithm take
into account the existence of such outliers.
It is difficult to enumerate all the potential sources of non-conformity. This might serve
as a challenge for building a profile to survive such changes. It will be the goal to err on the
side of accurate attributions. In this work, it will be preferred, like in the case above, for the
attacker to be given redundant identities. If the error was made in the other direction, it would
run the risk of incorrectly colliding identifications. Realistically, the same individual attacking
from two different locations may very well be two different “attackers” as the motives behind
the attacks might be different when at home or at work.
4.4 Feature Selection
4.4.1 Ideal feature characteristics
The description of the potential sources of variance given above is very optimistic. While it
is true each of the variables mentioned might vary, based upon the origin of an attack, not all
are detectable, reliable, and discernible. These three characteristics are what will be necessary
to generate a profile of an attacker, based upon his network traffic.
The obvious first requirement is the feature must be detectable. This can be further broken
down into two characteristics. First, the feature must be present in enough of the attacker’s
traffic that it is guaranteed sufficient to generate an attribution. Ideally, it will be present in
all transmissions from the attacker, but this is not strictly necessary. Features that occur only
in special cases (unless the special case in itself is a feature) are unlikely to be of much value.
Second, the feature must be observable from the defender’s vantage point. Further discussion
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of this will follow.
The feature must also be reliable within the set of attacks from an attacker. Like diction or
a fingerprint, it must express itself independent of the specific action of the source. Ideally, the
feature will express itself in the same manner in every attack from the same attacker. However,
it is possible that due to the combined contributions of a number of features, an attribution
might still be possible even if a subset of the features are not always consistent.
Finally, the feature must vary to some degree between attackers. That is to say, the feature
should reliably discern between two attackers. Like reliability, the entire set of identifying
features need not vary between every attack as long as enough of them vary to generate
a unique profile. However, in the ideal case, every attacker will exhibit every feature in a
unique way. Due to the limited number of features which meet the detectability criterion, the
requirements of reliability and discern-ability might often be in conflict.
4.4.2 Sources of features
Returning to Table 4.1, potential sources of features can be extracted from each of the
communication layers. At the lowest level, the physical layer, are simply “bits on the wire”
(or pulses in/on the carrier). Here, there is no notion of routing, applications, sessions, or
anything but the physical representation of the signal. One could just as easily understand
this level with an oscilloscope as a network traffic analyzer. Since a network connection is
likely to consist of multiple physical links, it is unlikely that any identifying information at this
level will be transmitted beyond the other end of the wire. Such local identification is useful
for authenticating that a device is actually who it asserts to be at the link level. However,
for the purposes of Cyberprints, where attacks are likely to come from many links away, such
information is of no value. The physical layer fails the requirement of detectability.
Similarly, at the data-link level, most of the information is pertinent only to devices on the
local network. The contents of an Ethernet frame header, for example, consist of a constant
preamble (for synchronization), a constant start of frame delimiter, a source and destination
Media Access Control (MAC) address, a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) tag, and an
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EtherType field. The payload is then appended with a frame check sequence (cyclic redundancy
check - CRC) and a 12-octet gap. The only features which might be valuable for attribution in
this list are the source and destination MAC address, and the CRC. The others will be constant
for every packet on the local network segment. However, these will be removed and replaced
as soon as the frame leaves the local network. Unless the attacker is on the local network,
data-link-level methods have no value. This layer also fails the requirement of detectability, as
well as that of discernability.
Next is the network layer. Finally, at this layer some potentially useful features start to
emerge. Because this is the first level at which features will survive outside the boundaries of
the local area network (detectability), it automatically warrants consideration for identifying
features. The most common end-to-end protocols at this level are the Internet Protocol (pri-
marily version 4, but increasingly also version 6) and the Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP). There are a number of other protocols at this level, but many of them are little used
or are used only in special cases, such as information exchange between ISP routers. The
requirements of reliability and discernability will require further analysis at this level.
Layered on top of IP are the two most widely used protocols on the Internet, the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP/IP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP/IP). Because TCP
creates its own four-layer model of network traffic, distinct from the seven-layer OSI model,
TCP and UDP do not clearly fall into either the network layer or session layer of the OSI
model. TCP and UDP are both used to transmit data using IP addressing and seemingly fall
into the network layer. However, TCP also contains a powerful state-based architecture able
to establish, maintain, and terminate network sessions, which are more abstract than a single
transmission. For this reason (and because TCP and UDP often serve similar purposes) both
TCP and UDP might also fall in the session layer of the OSI model. Regardless of where they
fall, they are bursting with potential features for use in attribution. Because of its complexity,
TCP holds much promise. TCP clearly meets the definition of detectability (although there are
ways for attackers to cloak these features). Analysis of features at this level has been shown to
hold value for determining the operating system on the other end of a communication (Pouget
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and Dacier, 2004; Spangler, 2003). It is reasonable to be optimistic about the chances for
reliable and discernible features in these protocols.
The presentation and application layers are likely to be highly dependent upon the exact
target of attack. However, they might also be indicative of the specific attack tool(s) used.
In many ways, these layers can be considered together, as many applications handle both the
presentation and user-interface tasks. For example, a web browser is responsible for negoti-
ating encryption and compression in the transmission with the web server, which is clearly a
presentation layer issue (i.e., data prepared for presentation). However,it is also responsible for
rendering the data output from the decryption and decompression for use by the user. Because
compression and encryption both essentially randomize the payload, they are unlikely to prove
useful in attribution. However, if a particular kind of compression or encryption is used, this
might represent a feature.
Assuming the application payload is detectable (i.e., observed after decryption and decom-
pression, if applicable), it contains features with the most promise of discrimination between
attackers. Attackers are likely to use different attack tools and methods, and this might be
reflected in the data they transmit. However, it also is likely to have a great deal of variation
even when coming from a single attacker. Therefore, reliability might be a concern. Only
experimentation will tell how useful these data are.
Spread across multiple layers are features dependent upon the user or organization per-
petrating the attack. Such things are sometimes called “Layer 8” in the OSI model — the
human element of network communications. Such things as time of day when attacks are per-
petrated, days when the attacks are not observed (e.g., holidays), timing in relation to current
events, intentional or accidental self-identification by the attacker, or any number of other
“soft” features might be useful for attribution. However, many of these are extremely difficult
to quantify and process in an automated way. Therefore, only features which can be directly
determined directly from the observed traffic, in a quantifiable way, will be considered for use
in a Cyberprint.
Potential sources of features have been identified, as shown in Figure 4.2. In the next
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section, features from each source will be enumerated.
• Network Layer: Internet Protocol, Internet Control Message Protocol
• Transmission Control Protocol, User Datagram Protocol
• Presentation Layer: Compression, encryption schemes
• Application Layer: Data related to tools or methods used by the attacker
• “Layer 8”: Time of day, day of year, self-identification, other quantifiable “soft” features
directly observable from network traffic
Figure 4.2 Sources of Cyberprint Features
4.4.3 Potential features
These sources of features now serve as the launching point for a more thorough enumer-
ation of potentially useful information in network packets and streams. This distinction is
important, and will play an important part in determining how features are analyzed. Due
to the packetized nature of Internet communications, a single transmission might consist of a
multitude of packets. For now, when features are discussed in the context of network streams,
it is to mean aggregate statistics about the features of all packets contained within a single
transmission. When the distinction between single packet features and network stream statis-
tics might otherwise be ambiguous, it will be explicitly stated. Otherwise, one should assume
that all features are features of network streams.
At the network layer, available features will be confined to those found in the Internet
Protocol (IP) header or Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) header. These features are
listed in Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Many of these features are volatile or subject to manipulation
in that they can easily be masked or varied by using a stepping stone in the attack. However,
some or all might survive, depending upon the attack and attacker.
In the most simple case, the only information needed from these streams is the source IP
address. However, if this approach was useful in general, there would be little discussion of
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more advanced attribution techniques. So, it should be assumed this field will not directly
identify the attacker. However, it might not be useless for identification. Perhaps an attacker
uses the same set of intermediate nodes, or always launches the attack from a given country
or Internet service provider. Even though the IP address is not uniquely tied to the attacker,
it might still be useful in developing a profile.
Many other features in IP headers will be a function of the particular software used by the
attacker. Different operating systems (and versions of the same operating system) might resolve
ambiguity in network standards in different ways. This might show itself in the exact sequence
in which options are set during a communication, for example, or perhaps the aggressiveness of
fragmentation. Support for explicit congestion notification and congestion avoidance, as well
as traffic prioritization through the DiffServ Codepoint field, might also be unique.
If an attacker is on an unreliable system or connection, is using poorly written attack tools,
or is attempting to manipulate traffic en route, this might also be detectable. IP packets make
use of a checksum value computed before transmission, so the recipient can verify the data
were communicated correctly. In the examples above, there are reasons why this value might
often be incorrect.
In IPv6, there is still a great deal of haziness in implementation. For example, the use
of scoped extension headers — meant for consumption by the endpoint, routers, or each hop
— might indicate a particular implementation. Currently, there is a discrepancy between
Windows and Unix-based implementations. Windows clients randomize the address suffix
while Unix-based software (by default) uses the hardware address of the sender. Additionally,
the use of rarely used or experimental features (such as the Flow label) will likely be useful as
part of a profile in IPv6 for some time as the protocol matures and is taken up by more users.
However, its use relative to IPv4 is still quite limited. Thus, it is less likely to be part of many
attacks.
The way in which hosts handle ICMP errors or the specific codes they return in response
to probes are informative in the same way. However, unlike IP headers, ICMP messages are
highly likely to be modified en route or blocked completely. They also have the disadvantage
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Table 4.2 IPv4 Features
Label Content
IP Version 4
Header Length Length of entire header
DiffServ Codepoint (DSCP) Traffic prioritization
Explicit Congestion Notifica-
tion (ECN)
Congestion avoidance
Length Total packet length
Time to Live (TTL) Number of additional hops before packet is returned
to sender
Identification (ID) Pseudo-unique identifier
Fragmentation Flags Concerning the reassembly of fragments
Segment Offset The distance of this packet from the first packet in the
stream
Next Protocol The protocol (e.g., TCP) encapsulated by this header
Checksum An integrity check
Source/Destination IP addresses of stream endpoints
Options Additional (optional) header data
of usually being most useful in active probes of a network and are infrequently used in attacks
(at least recently).
Similarly, the values in the TCP or UDP headers might be useful. Tables 4.5 and 4.6
enumerate these parameters. Like IP and ICMP, there is a possibility that part or all of the
profile will not survive retransmission along a multi-step path. However, the complexity of
TCP, in particular, makes it likely that idiosyncrasies in protocol implementations will exist.
Source port numbers, for example, are supposed to be random (at least between 1025 and
65535). However, attack tools might manually craft network packets that use the same port
or range of ports for this purpose. They might also always try to attack the same range
of destination ports — for example hitting 80 (the common HTTP port), 443 (the HTTP
over SSL port), 8080, 8081, 8443, 8888, and 10,000 (some common ports used by other web
software).
Initial sequence number generation has received much attention in the last ten years, as
many operating systems traditionally simply increment this number for each connection. This
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Table 4.3 IPv6 Features
Label Content
Version 6
Traffic Class Combination of DSCP and ECN (above)
Flow Label Uses being defined, intended for real-time communi-
cations
Length Size of payload
Next Header Type of the next header in the chain
Hop Limit Analogous to TTL (above)
Source/Destination IP addresses of stream endpoints
Extension Headers
Extension Header Length Total length of extension header
Options Type of the next header in the chain
Routing Type Indicates special routing treatment
Fragment Offset The distance of this packet from the first packet in the
stream
More Fragments Indicates whether or not more fragments are to follow
ID Pseudo-unique identifier used for reassembly
Authentication/Encryption
Encapsulating Payload
Used for IPSec, the security extensions to IP
Table 4.4 ICMP Features
Label Content
Type Indicates purpose of transmission
Code More detail regarding the purpose
Checksum An integrity check
Variable Content Field Varies based upon type and code
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made it easy to mount a “man-in-the-middle” (interception and modification of traffic) attack.
It also made it easy to peer behind firewalls to determine the number of devices hiding behind
the translation. Recent operating systems randomize this value for each connection or at least
make it more difficult to predict. However, the pattern of ISNs in an attack might reveal
something about an attacker’s environment.
Window sizing is a process highly dependent upon the connection endpoints. The TCP
protocol attempts to make the most optimal use of a connection medium by sending packets as
quickly as possible from end-to-end. In the case of links at (or over) capacity, links which are
unreliable and drop packets, or recipient applications which cannot keep up with the traffic (as
a few examples), the sender and receiver might need to scale down the speed at which traffic
is sent. Conversely, a sender might initially start sending traffic at a rate below the capacity
of the medium and recipient, requiring a gradual increase in rate until the capacity is reached.
At any point during this process, competition for capacity might enter the picture, requiring
an adjustment of the window size.
Like options in IP, flags in TCP might be used in novel ways. While there are strictly
adhered to sequences for initiating and terminating connections (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK; FIN,
ACK, FIN, ACK) and some other situations, the use of some of the other flags such as URG,
PSH, or ECE are highly dependent upon the systems involved. This kind of identification has
been shown useful to identify the operating system of a remote host (Spangler, 2003).
Timestamps allow for the calculation of average round trip time (latency), as well as jitter
(variation in latency) for a session. These values might be useful, if an attacker always uses
the same type of connection(s) or relays traffic through several intermediate nodes. Each
connection and node adds some processing delay while the traffic is received, analyzed, perhaps
modified, and re-transmitted.
There is also the possibility that some of the “layer eight” features of the attacker will
be revealed through the timestamp. Do attacks always happen during business hours in a
particular time zone? Does the attack stop during Ramadan, Christmas, Hanukkah, or some
other holiday that might suggest a particular region or country? Did the attack correspond
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with the timing of a conventional (non-cyber) attack? Of course these last two would require
both external information about the attacker and current events, as well as a broader view of
the attack history, but the potential remains.
There is also likely to be a correlation between geographic distance and latency, but it
is not as strong as one might expect, due to the many different kinds of connections used.
For example, sending traffic between two buildings next door to each other using a satellite
connection would entail tens or hundreds of milliseconds of latency, but sending traffic from
New York to Beijing might take only a few milliseconds using underground and undersea
optical cables. However, one can expect more connections and longer connections (the former
more than the latter) should have an overall positive correlation with latency. The level of
development within a country might also have a correlation — more developed countries are
likely to have higher quality and lower latency links.
The presentation and application layers are likely to vary, based upon the application
endpoints. However, there is no guarantee there will be any interceptable indication of what
schemes are used. Data transformations at this layer are things such as (de)compression,
(de)encryption, or format conversions.
If known, the choice of algorithm for these tasks might be informative, but this informa-
tion is not likely to be present. In many cases the application endpoints will be designed or
configured with a certain algorithm in mind, removing the need to signal the algorithm being
used in the transmission. However, certain protocols, such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP), have optional presentation layer components that might be observable.
If an application makes use of encryption or compression at this layer, observation of
the traffic in-motion is unlikely to be of much use. A good encryption scheme will generate a
randomized output for a given input (dependent upon the encryption scheme, of course). Thus,
even the same data sent twice might not appear the same both times. Similarly, compression
is highly input dependent, and even a small change in input could conceivably result in a very
different compressed payload. Therefore, from a profiling perspective, there is little value in
encrypted or compressed payloads, and analysis should encompass only the network layer.
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Table 4.5 TCP Features
Label Content
Source/Destination Port numbers on endpoints. Many destination ports
are standardized.
Sequence Number Number of packet in sequence, beginning with Initial
Sequence Number (ISN).
Acknowledgment Number Next sequence number expected by sender.
Offset The distance of this packet from the first packet in the
stream.
Window Size Number of bytes the sender is willing to receive in a
single packet.
Checksum An integrity check.
Urgent Pointer Offset of last urgent packet in stream (if URG flag is
set).
Flags
NS Nonce sum, protects against malicious concealment of
ECN-marked packets.
CWR Congestion window reduced, confirmation of ECE (be-
low) receipt and window size adjustment.
ECE Explicit congestion notification echo, notification of
ECN support or experienced congestion.
URG Urgent data.
ACK Acknowledgment.
PSH Push buffered data to application.
RST Reset session.
SYN Synchronize sequence numbers (sometimes: Synthe-
size session).
FIN Terminate (Finish) session.
Options
No-Operation Aligns fields on word boundaries.
Maximum Segment Size Largest transmittable packet.
Window Scale Magnifies the value of the window size field.
Selective Acknowledgment
Permitted
Notify of support for confirmation of partially com-
plete transmissions.
Selective Acknowledgment Confirmation of partially complete transmission.
Timestamp and Echo of Pre-
vious Timestamp
Compute round-trip time and protect against wrap-
around of sequence number.
Alternate Checksum Request Request a different checksum algorithm.
Alternate Checksum Data Value of alternate checksum.
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Table 4.6 UDP Features
Label Content
Source/Destination Port numbers on endpoints. Many destination ports
are standardized.
Length Size of entire datagram.
Checksum An integrity check.
However, if the payload is clear-text and uncompressed, it is perhaps as close to literary
analysis as any part of Cyberprinting. There are no general features of payloads that can
be used for analysis, since the payload is by definition a free-form field. However, existing
techniques, such as n-gram analysis, or overall statistics, such as length or distribution of
binary values, might prove useful.
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CHAPTER 5. METHOD
5.1 Datasets
To perform this experiment, methods of generating and dissecting a variety of packets
were needed. To generate the traffic, a set of virtual machines was created, each running
one of Debian Etch, Red Flag Linux, FreeBSD 5, FreeBSD 9, Windows XP, or Windows 7.
Each of these machines had three attack tools installed: THC Hydra, Nmap version 4, and
Nmap version 5. Some difficulty was incurred to run identical versions of each program in
each operating system. This largely determined the software applications used. THC Hydra
was used to perform an HTTP and IMAP brute force attack against the Apache and Dovecot
services running on the target. Nmap (both versions) was used to perform a port scan of the
target.
The network topology for this test was virtual, as well. Each machine/application combi-
nation was used to attack the target virtual machine, which was running Debian Etch. The
attack traffic (and only the attack traffic) was captured on the target for later analysis. Each
machine/application combination was used to attack the target directly (i.e., no intermediate
network devices) through a FreeBSD 9 virtual machine acting as a router (i.e., no translation)
and the same FreeBSD 9 virtual machine acting as a network address translating router (i.e.,
all traffic appears to originate from the same source address on the external side of this router).
For the purposes of analysis, the mergecap utility was used to combine these data into files
that contained all traffic for each operating system and application. The tcprewrite program
was then used to undo the network address translation (for the data sets in which this occurred)
of the source address, so that a consistent identifier was present for analysis. During analysis
this value was used only as a tag and was randomized before being used in any statistical
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methods.
The feature set developed included all header parameters of the IPv4 and TCP headers
collected using the open source JNetPcap library. A full listing of these features can be seen
in the results section. Each packet capture file was passed through a TCP reassembly step,
and packets were assigned into streams by their source and destination.
The features from each stream were combined into a database, which also included the
host, application, and level of obfuscation (direct, routed, or translated) for the stream. This
database was used as an input to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) that computed
the significance of each feature for differentiation of the operating system, application, level of
obfuscation, and the interaction of operating system and application.
5.2 Analysis Method
Now that a list of potential features has been created and a test dataset generated, how
are the data processed to reveal a profile? Like the features, any analysis method chosen for
this task must be sufficiently sensitive to detect differences between attackers, but sufficiently
reliable to detect the same attacker in multiple situations. It should also be possible to tune
the sensitivity of the method and ideally to give some bounds on the level of certainty of an
attribution.
Given the limited amount of data available to create a profile, this seems like a tall order.
The central thesis of this work is that by using statistical methods similar or inspired by those
used in literary analysis, some level of discernment between attackers can be made, based upon
only the traffic visible to target of the attack. The statistical profile created by the analysis
method is the Cyberprint of the attack and, ideally, the attacker.
5.2.1 Analysis of variance
Before delving too deeply into the signatures present in the dataset, first it is worth eval-
uating whether sufficient information exists to make a discernment. For this reason, the first
step to determine the feasibility of Cyberprints is to run an analysis of variance. Specifically,
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an analysis will be performed to determine the effect of the operating system, attack tool, ob-
fuscation method, and the interaction of operating system and attack tool upon each identified
feature. Because this involves multiple independent variables and the interaction of two of
them, a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) will be performed.
Based upon this output, it will be determined which of these factors have a non-zero, but
not significant impact, upon each of the features. This will allow for a demonstration of the
effects of noise in later examinations. Similarly, those features that do not vary, and thus have
zero impact, can be separated from the overall features.
5.2.2 Feature extraction (Principal Component Analysis)
After the data are collected, they need to be normalized suitable for statistical analysis.
Additionally, it will improve the performance of analysis methods if the dimensionality can
be reduced. To achieve this, Principal Component Analysis (PCA, sometimes called Factor
Analysis) will be used. An extensive treatment of the theory and mechanisms of PCA is given
in the text by Ian Joliffe (Joliffe, 2002), but a brief summary will be provided here for the
unfamiliar reader.
A good dataset to use for this explanation is one of biological measures of a set of indi-
viduals. For example: height, weight, blood pressure, blood glucose, heart rate, and ethnicity.
When measured by a physician, these are treated as separate features. One does not calculate
blood pressure as some function of height and weight. However, it is well-known that these
measures are not independent by any means. The ratio of weight to height, perhaps combined
with some element of ethnicity, is known to be a fairly reliable predictor of hypertension and
other cardiovascular diseases. The exact link, or causal factor, is subject to much debate, but
most would agree it is there.
Using PCA, one could take these same six features of a sample set and identify some
underlying component X, a function of these features. The exact causal mechanism will of
course not be identified, so one is free to label this factor as seen fit. However, it can be said
when this new component varies, the directly measured features co-vary with it. This is the
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essence of PCA — covariance.
The primary use of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of highly-dimensional datasets.
One can imagine in the example above, there might be any other number of biological measures.
If there were twenty measures taken and it was desired to find a pattern to help determine
the causes of cardiovascular disease, one would need to consider all twenty measures, which
amounts to a feature space in twenty dimensions. Humans are not good at seeing patterns in
data in more than three dimensions, and even computational methods become quickly bogged
down as dimensionality increases. One might also assume that some of the features have little
impact on the dependent variable in question.
PCA takes the covariance matrix of all of the features across all observations and performs
an eigendecomposition. The output of this transformation is a matrix of eigenvalues and
eigenvectors. Each eigenvector represents the coordinates of each of the original points in a
newly constructed component space. The eigenvalue corresponding to that vector indicates the
relative contribution of that component to the overall variance of the dataset. After ordering
these vectors by descending magnitude of the eigenvalues, one can select some number of
dominant vectors as the principal components. The cutoff is dependent upon the level of
variance desired to be accounted. In highly noisy datasets with many features, the number of
components required to account for a satisfactory amount of variance might be nearly the same
as the number of features, and little benefit is had. On the other hand, this new dimensionality
might be a significant reduction if a carefully selected set of features which have a high level
of dependence.
A simpler example might help illustrate this point more clearly. If one were to measure the
horsepower and sales volume of every model of car on a dealer’s lot, one would expect some
correlation. In fact, one might expect a negative correlation, not because people do not want
to buy fast cars, but because fast cars are more expensive. Imagine a plot of horsepower versus
sales volume in two dimensions. It is not likely that this would be a strict y = N −x function,
but if one were to draw the line of linear regression through the dataset, it would probably
approximate it. Now, imagine rotating the dataset so this regression line is horizontally level.
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One might now say that to move to the right on this line would be predictive of a higher car
cost and to move left the inverse. In other words, as horsepower increases and sales volume
decreases, a new component — hypothesized to be cost — increases.
If a third feature, gas mileage, were introduced, it would likely co-vary in a similar fashion.
But, there might also be another component now identified, which one could perhaps identify
as weight. Sticking with the two-dimensional example above, a third dimension would now
be added for this new component, and PCA would place the axis of this new dimension
orthogonally through the two-dimensional plot in a way that maximizes the amount of the
covariance not accounted for by the first component accounted for by the second component.
This process is repeated until all components are accounted, and one can then choose the
number of components to retain for explanatory purposes.
5.2.3 Cluster Analysis
Recall that the output resulting from PCA is a set of vectors which represents the coor-
dinates of the original points in a a new component space. If one looks at the example of
biological measures above, it can be imagined that two individuals with a similar height and
weight might have more in common than two individuals who differ greatly in these measures.
Therefore, one can say these two features provide some information about the similarity be-
tween the two individuals. Like the independent variables in feature space, one can look to
proximity as a measure of similarity between two observations in component space. Visualiz-
ing and measuring this distance, like the space in which it resides, is beyond the abilities of
humans for anything beyond three dimensions. Thus, a general method is needed to determine
proximity in n-space.
The simplest method to achieve this is by extending Euclidean distance to n-dimensions.
Just as distance can be computed in 2-space as d2 =
√
(x2 − x1)2 + (y2 − y1)2, distance can
be computed in n-space by adding the additional coordinates. This works well for two points,
but what if instead of measuring the Euclidean distance, it is desired to determine the most
similar points from a large set of points in n-space? The relationship is called a “cluster” and
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a single dataset might have any number of clusters of similar points within it.
The Euclidean distance between every pair of points can be calculated and one can set a
threshold for how close two points must be to be defined as “closely related”. There are three
problems with this. Primarily, it is computationally inefficient to compare every pair of points
(O(n2)). Second, determining this threshold is a subjective measure and one must experiment
with different values to “tune” the algorithm to the application. Third, this method does not
perform well on clusters not evenly distributed and equi-distant from a centerpoint, or datasets
in which the clusters are different sizes. A cluster that is skewed or stretched along an axis
will most likely be identified as two or more different clusters by such a method. Similarly, two
adjacent and similarly shaped, but separate, clusters might be identified as one.
To resolve this difficulty, a number of clustering algorithms have been developed over the
last several decades. The final step in the analysis of Cyberprint’s potential is evaluating the
performance of a selection of these algorithms on the PCA output. To this end, each clustering
algorithm described below will be used to cluster the data, and the correctness of fit will be
evaluated. To aid in this analysis, the ELKI (Achtert et al., 2008) Java application will be
used. This program contains a variety of clustering methods and evaluation functions ready
to use with an input file.
For comparison purposes, a simple “by label” clustering will be performed. This method
simply assigns each point to a cluster, based upon the label given it. For this and the following
algorithms, clustering will be compared to operating system labels, attack tool (application)
labels, and the combined operating system/application label.
The K-Means algorithm (Hartigan and Wong, 1976) is one of the simpler algorithms eval-
uated. The algorithm starts with K points selected at random from the dataset (a modified
K-Means++ algorithm performs this selection to maximize dispersion). Every point in the
dataset is assigned to one of these points, according to which is closest (Euclidean measure).
This effectively partitions the space into Voronoi cells in n-dimensions. Then, for as many
iterations as desired, the algorithm will find a point as close to the center of each cell as possi-
ble and repeat the assignment. After these iterations are finished, the clusters are simply the
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assignments of points to the nearest center point. This algorithm is well-suited to datasets
where the clusters are of similar size and shape, and the number of clusters is known a priori.
Neither of these assumptions is likely to hold, in general, for Cyberprints.
In the Shared Nearest Neighbor algorithm (Ertoz et al., 2002), a set of nearest-neighbors
is computed for every node. A threshold is set regarding the number of nodes allowable in this
set. After all of these sets are computed, a comparison between every set of nodes is made and
any two nodes which have each other in their nearest-neighbor set are identified as being in
the same cluster. This has the advantage of including outlier points that might be ignored by
a simple nearest-neighbor approach (such as K-Means). The potential for branching clusters
that do not originate from a single central point allows for the detection of irregularly shaped
or unevenly sized clusters. It also has an advantage over methods in that one does not need
to specify a target number of clusters. In SNN the work of determining what constitutes
a cluster and how many are present is part and parcel of the clustering technique. While it
unfortunately does not address the complexity requirements, this is still a more useful approach
for Cyberprints.
Other algorithms that would have been evaluated, had the first two performed well, included
Expectation-Maximization (Dempster et al., 1977), DBSCAN (Ester et al., 1996), OPTICS
(Ankerst et al., 1999), and SUBCLU (Kailing et al., 2004). However, as will be explained
in the next chapter, analysis along this avenue was terminated before reaching these more
complex methods. Instead, a different path was taken.
5.2.4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
An alternative method of evaluating the similarity of two network streams is to compare
their features directly. There are two disadvantages of this method. The first is that the dimen-
sionality of the dataset to be analyzed will be much higher, leading to increased computational
and storage requirements. Second, it leaves a great deal of room for noise, since there is no
mechanism of ranking features by their contribution (see the discussion of parsimony above).
Additionally, there is no reason to expect that any clustering methods would work better in
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feature-space than component-space. In fact, one might expect them to perform more poorly
for the reasons above.
To analyze the test datasets for Cyberprints, there is a way around these problems. The
number of features, and thus dimensions, can be greatly decreased by leaving out the features
with little to contribute. Again, there is no automatic way to accomplish this. However, it is
possible to use knowledge of the network protocols involved and the test dataset to focus the
analysis.
By selecting a subset of the features to use for this analysis, this method might become
tractable. For each of these features, a frequency distribution of values for each type of oper-
ating system and attack tool in the dataset can be generated. For the purposes of evaluation,
ten random subsets will be chosen from each class. These subsets can be compared against
others in their own class, as well as other classes, to determine whether these distributions
might present an identifying profile.
To do so, however, a metric is needed to decide how well two frequency distributions match.
For this, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be used. This statistic provides the lowest upper
bound (supremum) of the difference between two cumulative frequency functions. In other
words, one converts the frequency distributions into cumulative frequency distributions. For
each frequency, one then computes the difference between the two functions. The biggest
divergence is D, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.
For the purposes of rejecting the null hypothesis, this value must be greater than a critical
value. However, for the purposes of evaluating its potential in Cyberprints, these values will
be averaged across the selected features. A matrix can then be constructed and the relative
similarity of within-class and between-class average D values can be examined. One would
expect the differences within a class to be consistently less than those between classes.
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS
6.1 Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA)
The MANOVA test compares variance within and between groups to determine the effect of
each explanatory variable upon each dependendent variable, as well as the effect of interactions
between explanatory variables. This statistic allows for the elimination of several features from
further analysis. First, however, several features arre removed that were meaningless in the
test dataset.
The initial set of features, based upon the selection of TCP/IP traffic for testing and the
capabilities of JNetPcap to extract them, are shown in Table 6.1. After running a MANOVA,
several features were found to have no variation. These included the IPv4 Average Header
Length; IPv4 Average Offset; IPv4 Number of More Fragment Flags; Minimum, Average, and
Maximum TCP Sequence and Acknolwedgment numbers; and IPv4 Checksum Error Rate.
The source and destination address were removed, since in this test case the destination is
constant and the source is randomized before analysis. The destination port was removed,
since it is constant between sets.
As shown in Figure 6.1, MANOVA also shows the strength of each feature to discriminate
the operating system, application, and operating system x application interaction. Every fea-
ture not already eliminated was useful for discriminating the application (at a 95% confidence
interval). The minimum ID value, number of IPv4 ECE and ECN flags, average Maximum
Segment Size, average Timestamp interval, average Urgent offset, number of CWR flags, num-
ber of TCP ECE flags, number of Urgent flags, and variations in any of the features were
not useful for discriminating the operating system. The same set, with the exceptions of the
minimum ID value, number of IPv4 ECN flags, and variation in sequence number were not
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Table 6.1 Initial Set of Features for Consideration and their Relevance
Feature Operating System Application OS x App
IPv4: Source Address
IPv4: Destination Address
IPv4: Average Header Length
IPv4: Average Packet Length X X X
IPv4: Average Offset
IPv4: Minimum ID X X
IPv4: Average ID X X X
IPv4: Maximum ID X X X
IPv4: Variation in ID X X X
IPv4: Minimum TTL X X X
IPv4: Maximum TTL X X X
IPv4: Average DSCP X X
IPv4: Number of ECE Flags X
IPv4: Number of ECN Flags X X
IPv4: Number of Don’t Fragment Flags X X X
IPv4: Number of More Fragment Flags
IPv4: Checksum Error Rate
TCP: Source Port X X X
TCP: Destination Port
TCP: Average Maximum Segment Size X
TCP: Average Urgent Offset X
TCP: Average Window Size X X X
TCP: Average Timestamp Interval X
TCP: Variation in Timestamp X
TCP: Minimum Acknowledgment Number
TCP: Average Acknowledgment Number
TCP: Maximum Acknowledgment Number
TCP: Variation in Acknowledgment Number X
TCP: Minimum Sequence Number
TCP: Average Sequence Number
TCP: Maximum Sequence Number
TCP: Variation in Sequence Number X X
TCP: Number of ACK Flags X X X
TCP: Number of CWR Flags X
TCP: Number of ECE Flags X
TCP: Number of FIN Flags X X X
TCP: Number of PSH Flags X X X
TCP: Number of RST Flags X X X
TCP: Number of SYN Flags X X X
TCP: Number of URG Flags X
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useful for discriminating the operating system x application interaction. This is summarized
in Table 6.1
Figure 6.1 Significance of Discriminating Features (MANOVA)
6.2 Principal Component Analysis and Clustering
The second phase of analysis, principal component analysis, proved not to reveal any useful
information. After computing the principal components for the set of features identified as
relevant above, it was found that nearly all (greater than 99.99%) of the variance was accounted
for by a single component. As shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 (generated with ELKI), the
distribution of observations within this component space was nearly uniform, leaving no hope
for clustering. Even though the individual features have significance in discriminating the
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operating system and application (as shown in the MANOVA), it seems the combination of
them is too noisy for PCA to handle.
Figure 6.2 Output of Principal Component Analysis, by application
Figure 6.3 Output of Principal Component Analysis, by operating system
To take a step back, there was still the possibility that clustering might work within feature-
space, even if it did not work in component space. Again, using the set of relevant features,
a simple “by-label” clustering was run on the data. Visualizations of this output are shown
in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. The top row of histograms shows the distribution of values within
each dimension. Using this additional tool, features which showed a single peak or uniform
distributions were removed from the analysis. This leaves the 12 dimensions shown in the
previously referenced figures (which also include the source address, left in for comparison).
These features were: the number of ACK flags; the minimum, average, and maximum ID; the
number of Don’t Fragment flags; the number of FIN flags; the number of PSH flags; the source
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port; the average packet length; the minimum and maximum TTL; and the window size.
The lower panels in these figures shown cross sections comparing every pair of dimensions.
Within these, one can see evidence of clusters. The largest panel shows a plot in 3-dimensions
of the first three dimensions. While this leaves out most of the features, it supports the idea
that clusters might be identifiable within the data.
Figure 6.4 Analysis of 13-dimensional feature space of significant features,
by application
The K-Means and Shared Nearest Neighbor clustering algorithms were then run on this
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Figure 6.5 Analysis of 13-dimensional feature space of significant features,
by operating system
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Figure 6.6 K-Means analysis of 13-dimensional feature space of significant
features (k=6, 10 iterations)
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same set of relevant features. The output is shown in Figure 6.6 for K-Means. As shown, the
clusters sometimes overlapp, are irregularly shaped, or are disjoint. This type of dataset is
known to be poorly suited for K-Means, and thus an SNN analysis was run. However, SNN
was unable to identify any clusters, even with great experimentation with neighborhood size
and cluster density. Most likely, this was due to the fact that the ranges of values vary widely
between dimensions — a problem that PCA would fix, if it worked otherwise. Other clustering
algorithms, even those suited for higher-dimensionality datasets, would likely suffer these same
issues. Instead of continuing down the path of clustering algorithms, it was decided to try a
new approach.
6.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Analysis
Principal Component Analysis, which otherwise would have evened out the large range of
values in the explanatory variables, did not prove useful. These ranges of values are too broad
for an overall clustering to be useful. Therefore, a method is needed that allows for aggregating
a similarity comparison of each individual feature. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic,
this is possible.
For each operating system and application, ten random groups of 100 streams were selected.
From each of these group, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) was computed for each
feature. An example of this is shown in Figure 6.7. Representative charts for each class are
included in Appendix A.
As evidenced in these figures, there are definite distinctions in the CDF for each class. As
expected, different operating systems and applications make different choices regarding the
generation of these features. The next step is to determine if the differences between classes
for these features are greater than the differences within classes.
To show this graphically, a heatmap-type illustration is used. Figure 6.8 uses this method
to show the overall average of the comparisons for each feature (more discussion in a moment).
Along each axis are rows and columns for each random sample, sorted by class. The value
at the intersection of each row and column is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-value derived by
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Figure 6.7 Feature Distribution Histogram: Debian Linux
comparing these two samples. These values are hidden in the heatmap, in favor of a color
gradient from green (most similar) to red (least similar), which is easier to analyze visually.
The heatmaps for Kolomogorov-Smirnov comparisons of individual features are included in
Appendix B.
One would expect that for each feature lower D-values would be found along the diagonal.
Obviously, a distribution compared to itself will have a value of zero for this statistic. Random
samples taken from the same class should also have low (if not zero) D-values. The perfect
outcome would be a set of ten, 10x10 green squares aligned on the diagonal y = 100 − x,
accompanied by 90 red squares off the diagonal. This would represent a perfect discrimination
between classes.
As shown in the remaining figures in Appendix B, some of the features are more reliable
for this method than others. Having already eliminated features that have little statistical
discernment value in the previous steps of MANOVA and histogram analysis, the list can be
further refined by removing features that have a poor showing in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
96
comparisons. Since this analysis has been visual so far, a threshold needs to be set to remove
the subjectivity from this process. For lack of a better threshold, features that display more
than 20 off-diagonal 10x10 blocks (including symmetrical mirrors) that are at least 60% green
will be eliminated. This is probably an overly restrictive selection and is not to say that
these last few eliminated features have no value whatsoever. In fact, the test for statistical
significance of the D-value is not used (as the primary concern is the relative values), so these
features might have value upon further inspection.
After this criterion is applied, the minimum IPv4 identifier, average IPv4 identifier, maxi-
mum IPv4 identifier, minimum TTL, maximum TTL, TCP FIN flags, and TCP PSH flags are
eliminated. After removing these from the overall average (leaving packet length, window size,
and source port) the heatmap shown in Figure 6.8 is obtained. For comparison, the heatmap
before removal of the features in shown in Figure B.1.
Several features of this visualization stand out and are worth discussing. First, it is apparent
that similarity is very much concentrated along the diagonal, as expected. Within classes there
appears to be a great deal of similarity.
Between similar classes, there is also similarity. There are three green blocks just off the
diagonal (six, if the symmetrical mirrors are counted). These blocks show discrimination be-
tween versions of FreeBSD, Nmap, or Windows is possibly not reliable using the three included
features. The other green block, far removed from the diagonal, shows a similarity between
Debian Linux and Red Flag Linux. This is not surprising since, even with different implemen-
tations of Linux, the underlying Kernel is similar or identical (sans version disparities). The
slight green shift in squares where an operating system is compared to an application is due
to the overlap in these datasets.
Concerning similarity between dissimilar datasets, the picture also appears positive. FreeBSD,
Windows, and Linux appear to be reliably discernible from each other. So, too, is the use of Hy-
dra in attacking HTTP versus IMAP. There is some small level of similarity between FreeBSD
5 and Debian, Windows 7, and Windows XP. For a Kolmogorov-Smirnov comparison with
n1 = n2 = 100 and α = 0.05, the critical value is approximately 0.1923 (calculated from
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Figure 6.8 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Comparisons: Overall Average (Best Fea-
tures)
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the Kolmogorov-Smirnov critical value formula, Dc = c(α)
√
n1+n2
n1∗n2 , where c(α) is the coeffi-
cient given in a lookup table. No values off the exact diagonal met this threshold, meaning
these between-disparate-classes similarities, while relatively anomalous, are not troubling in a
statistical sense (even at α = 0.001).
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Contributions
This dissertation has made several contributions to the cyber security body of knowledge.
First, the case for cyber deterrence was established. We demonstrated how asymmetric the
cyber battlefield is, and showed that there is a history of successful cyber attacks. We demon-
strated that the only way to establish cyber superiority is to deter attacks from ever making
attempts. A determined attacker, with enough time, will be able to find her way into even the
most secure systems. Therefore, one must remove this determination by affecting the decision
making calculus. This is a matter of either raising the perceived costs of attacking — by
demonstrating retaliatory capability — or lower the benefits — by establishing redundancies
and increasing the difficulty of the attack. However, due to the asymmetry of cyber warfare,
attackers who believe they will not be caught are unlikely to be dissuaded by difficulty (in
fact they might be enticed by it). By this reasoning, we have shown that a critical factor in
countering cyber attacks is the ability to attribute them.
After establishing this fact, we surveyed the literature to examine existing attribution
methods. We found these lacking, due to the following assumptions: 1) Omniscience, 2)
Omnipresence, and 3) A Priori Positioning. Removing these assumptions from the attribution
equation leaves only methods which can be performed with data directly accessible to the
defender, pulled from systems directly under his control, and with detection systems in place
at the time of attack. We showed that none of the existing attribution strategies hold up
under these restraints. After comparing cyber attribution to traditional methods of criminal
investigation, we showed that if one draws parallels between conventional crime and cyber
crime, a more realistic attribution technique is profiling — an, as yet, unexplored method of
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cyber attribution.
By examining the literature for literary analysis and software forensics, we found the
method of Stylometry. This method has been used with success in attributing the authors
of written documents using feature analysis. We proposed that this same methodology might
be used in cyber attribution, and compared it to the methods used in investigating other types
of crime such as arson or attacks with explosives.
Using what we learned from Stylometry, we first tried to make use of Principal Component
Analysis to tease apart the variance discovered using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance. It
was seen that the most discernment was detectable by attack tool, but the operating system
also had a number of distinctive characteristics, as well an interaction between operating system
and attack tool. These findings provide support to the idea that sophisticated attackers, who
use a constant set of attack tools (as they would if they had undergone formal training) or
custom tools used only by them, will leave a signature behind.
PCA showed to be an unusable method, at least with our selected set of features and
generated set of data. The features chosen, despite having significant statistical diversity, were
too closely correlated for PCA to separate into more than one usable axis. This single axis
showed a nearly uniform distribution of points across the component space for both operating
system and attack tool labeling. After rethinking the entire process, we decided to try an
alternate method.
We then performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses of the features in our dataset directly
(i.e., before performing any analysis of variance or covariance). By eliminating variables with
known insignificant contributions (from MANOVA and histogram analyses), we were able
to generate a subset of features likely to be usable in this type of analysis. We generated
heatmaps for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov comparisons of each of 10 randomly selected sets of
100 streams from each group of data (by application and operating system) and for each
feature set. These heatmap visualizations were used to show that similar operating systems
and applications might be difficult to differentiate, but that between-classes comparisons were
relatively divergent from within-class comparisons. We demonstrated that there are several
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IPv4 and TCP features that are particularly good predictors of the operating system and
application used by the attacker. These were the packet length, window size, and source
port. A secondary set of features that was useful, but didn’t meet our stricter criteria for
selection, included the minimum and maximum time to live, the don’t fragment flags, the
acknowledgement flags, the FIN flags, and the push flags.
These findings lend hope for a Cyberprint — a new method of network forensic analysis.
This method makes none of the assumptions of conventional attribution methods, relies upon
simple computations, and narrows the field of analyzed features. Just as law enforcement
and military personnel use feature-based techniques to identify biological, behavioral, and
methodological aspects of an attacker, so might Cyberprints illuminate the virtual face.
7.2 Future Work
The first extension of this work would be to refine the Kolmogorov-Smirnov comparison
process to the point where it can deliver a single, statistically-bounded answer to whether two
streams come from the same source. Being able to say these streams have a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov D-value of 5 is not useful in itself for decisions about attribution. Only in relation to
the D-values for comparisons with other traffic does this carry weight. Finding a way to develop
an overall score for the similarity of two streams would make this technique “field-ready”.
Second, more work needs to be completed to determine other features that might be useful
for Cyberprints. This analysis focused upon IPv4 and TCP features. Other protocols at the
network layer, as well as payload-specific features, should also be considered for use. “Layer
8” features, such as geolocation, could also prove useful. Finding ways to incorporate socio-
political metadata related to a stream, perhaps pulled from real-time feeds, would allow other
considerations, such as current world events, known attackers, and enemies of the defender.
Really, the potential for features is as boundless as cyberspace. If a feature can be correlated
with a traffic stream and quantified for analysis, it could potentially be used for a Cyberprint.
Finding features that, in general, have discriminatory power will enhance the capabilities of
this technique.
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Similarly, the test data used in this dissertation, while representing a variety of operat-
ing systems and several applications, is far from exhaustive. Testing this technique on more
complex datasets might reveal ways to make it more reliable. Only be exposing it to new
scenarios can it be refined to handle them. Thus, this work should be viewed as the genesis of
Cyberprints, which have much evolving to do.
One cannot think about any method of countering attackers without thinking of the manner
in which attackers will respond. For this reason analysis should be performed to determine
what methods of countering Cyberprints might be developed. Already, it is known that a
person wishing to hide her operating system can use a border device to scramble features,
such as the acknowledgment number, or proxy particular flags. If word of a signature-based
attribution method reach cyber criminals, they will no doubt find ways to make their signatures
more difficult to detect.
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APPENDIX A. FEATURE DISTRIBUTION HISTOGRAMS
Figure A.1 Feature Distribution Histogram: Debian Linux
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Figure A.2 Feature Distribution Histogram: FreeBSD 5
Figure A.3 Feature Distribution Histogram: FreeBSD 9
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Figure A.4 Feature Distribution Histogram: Red Flag Linux
Figure A.5 Feature Distribution Histogram: Windows 7
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Figure A.6 Feature Distribution Histogram: Windows XP
Figure A.7 Feature Distribution Histogram: Hydra HTTP Brute-Force
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Figure A.8 Feature Distribution Histogram: Hydra IMAP Brute-Force
Figure A.9 Feature Distribution Histogram: Nmap 4 Scan
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Figure A.10 Feature Distribution Histogram: Nmap 5 Scan
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APPENDIX B. KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV HEATMAPS
Figure B.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Comparisons: Overall Average, before
filtering
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Figure B.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: Packet Length
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Figure B.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: Minimum IPv4 Identifier
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Figure B.4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: Average IPv4 Identifier
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Figure B.5 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: Maximum IPv4 Identifier
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Figure B.6 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: Minimum IPv4 Time-to-Live
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Figure B.7 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: Maximum IPv4 Time-to-Live
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Figure B.8 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: IPv4 Don’t Fragment Flags
117
Figure B.9 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: TCP Source Port
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Figure B.10 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: TCP Acknowledgment Flags
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Figure B.11 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: TCP FIN Flags
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Figure B.12 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: TCP Push Flags
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Figure B.13 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Heatmap: TCP Window Size
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GLOSSARY
Advanced Persistent Threat An adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise
and significant resources, which allow creation of opportunities to achieve its objectives
by using multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, and deception). These objectives
typically include establishing and extending footholds within the information technology
infrastructure of targeted organizations for purposes of exfiltrating information, under-
mining or impeding critical aspects of a mission, program, or organization; or positioning
itself to carry out these objectives in the future. The advanced persistent threat: (i) pur-
sues its objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time; (ii) adapts to defenders
efforts to resist it; and (iii) is determined to maintain the level of interaction needed to
execute its objectives. (NIST SP 800-39, 2010)
Anonymity The state of not being associated with an identifiable party.
Anonymization The act of hiding one’s identity by some means of obfuscation.
APT See Advanced Persistent Threat.
Attribution The process of determining the source of an event, which might require over-
coming attempts at anonymization.
Bit Binary value 0 or 1. See also Byte.
Blacklist A list of entities denied to access a resource. This implies all entities not on the list
are granted access. See also Whitelist.
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Botnet A distributed network of software implants. Often remotely controlled and installed
without the knowledge or consent of the host system’s owner. May be used in a variety
of attacks.
Byte A series of eight bits. Usually measured using Greek/Latin prefixes for orders of mag-
nitude (e.g., MB for Megabytes, or one million bytes). See also Bit.
Casus Belli Justification for retaliation or other initiation of war. Latin for case (casus) for
war (bellum).
Chief Information Security Officer The executive in an organization tasked with Infor-
mation Assurance-related objectives. This position is sometimes combined with the Chief
Security Officer, who might also be responsible for additional security concerns.
CISO See Chief Information Security Officer.
Classification The separation of data into tiers, based upon the damage that might result if
it were to be exposed to unauthorized parties. Used extensively in military applications,
in particular.
Cloud An abstraction from the traditional model of static and single-purpose local physical
servers which makes data, services, and even entire infrastructures appear as a service
to an end-user. Often used to increase robustness of provided services, while decreasing
requirements for power, space, and cooling of data centers.
Critical Infrastructure Systems required for the safety and productivity of a population.
Examples include power transmission networks, emergency response services, transporta-
tion networks, and communication networks.
Cyberprint A new technique used to identify the probable source of a network transmission
using feature analysis.
Cyberspace The abstract idea of a domain of interaction in addition to those of land, sea, air,
and space. Consists of the digital exchange of information over network links between
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disparate devices.
Data Center A special-purpose facility, which houses a large number of computer and net-
work systems. Often hardened against attack, natural disaster, and other disturbances.
DDOS See Distributed Denial of Service Attack.
Deterrence The use of signaling through threats or demonstrations of force to affect the
decision-making process of a (potential) adversary.
Distributed Denial of Service Attack An adversarial action that uses large amounts of
traffic destined for a single host or network, generated by a large number of attacking
systems, to degrade or disable data transmission by the target. This effectively takes the
target oﬄine. See also Botnet.
Encryption The obfuscation of the the contents of a communication to protect these contents
from being observed by unauthorized parties.
Espionage The act of covertly gathering information about another party, usually without
authorization and perhaps illegally.
Executable A software program on a computer system. A piece of data which can be launched
(executed) to operate its own set of instructions.
Exploit A technique which can be used to take advantage of a vulnerability in a system.
Forensics (Cyber) The analysis of a computer system or recorded network transmission to
determine information about the identity or intent of an unknown party.
Header The portion of a network packet that contains basic information necessary for it to
reach its destination, possibly with assurances of transmission properties, such as priority.
Honeypot, Honeynet A system or network constructed with the purpose of enticing at-
tackers to divert their attention from production systems or to learn more about their
methods.
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ICANN See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
IDS See Intrusion Detection/Prevention System.
Information Assurance The profession of protecting confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity of information required for a business, government, or other entity to function in the
desired state.
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers The international agency re-
sponsible for delegating control of identifying tokens on the Internet. Specifically, do-
mains and IP Addresses.
Internet Protocol The protocol which exists at layer 3 of the OSI model (the network layer)
responsible for routing traffic between two nodes on a network or internetwork, using
specially crafted and assigned numeric addresses.
Internet Protocol Address The specially crafted numeric identifier used by the Internet
Protocol to determine a node’s identity on a network or internetwork.
Internet Service Provider An agency that maintains a substantial amount of throughput
and Internet Protocol address space, and allocates these resources to customers to allow
them to communicate with non-local nodes.
Intrusion Detection/Prevention System A system configured to watch for unauthorized
or malicious activity on a network connection or host, and (in the case of an IPS) take
steps to stop the attack and remediate its effects.
IP, IPv4, IPv6 See Internet Protocol.
IP Address See Internet Protocol Address.
IPS See Intrusion Detection/Prevention System.
ISP See Internet Service Provider.
Jitter Variation in latency. A second-order link statistic.
126
Jurisdiction The scope of authority to which an entity is legally entitled.
Latency The delay incurred during packet transmission, due to link characteristics or pro-
cessing delays.
Link A channel (usually physical) between two devices that allows them to exchange infor-
mation. When referring to a virtual channel (i.e., comprised of multiple physical links),
usually the term connection or session is used instead.
Malware Software which performs a function against the best interests of the owner of a
system. Often installed without the consent or knowledge of the owner, and often used
as part of either information theft or distributed denial of service attacks.
Packet A single unit of information, the smallest quanta that can be sent or received by a
network device. Consists of a header and payload.
Payload The actual data transmitted from source to destination without any peripheral data,
such as the header.
P2P See Peer-to-Peer Network.
Peer-to-Peer Network A network which has little or no hierarchy, in which all nodes com-
municate directly with each other. Some might have “super” nodes responsible for helping
locate other normal nodes, but all information is distributed among many nodes.
Proxy (Network) A system responsible for obtaining information from another server on
behalf of a client, or that acts as a go-between for a client and server, due to access
controls that would otherwise prevent communication between these two parties.
Risk The possibility of an unintended or undesired event occurring.
Root-kit A special type of Malware that tightly couples itself with the operating system,
making it difficult to remove and potentially very dangerous to the safety of information
on the compromised system.
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Router A network device which serves as an intermediary node to relay packets between other
devices on the Internet, even when they are far dispersed.
Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) The protocols which pro-
vide an encrypted connection between a client and server, optionally with verification
of the identification of both parties, over which other higher-level network protocols can
communicate. The most common usage is in HTTP/S, used to secure many financial
and otherwise sensitive web sites.
Spam Unsolicited electronic messages. Usually marketing material, often offensive or illegible
in nature.
SSL See Secure Socket Layer.
Steganography The hiding of a secondary, often encrypted, payload within an overt payload
(or ’cover’ payload) to prevent knowledge of the existence of the secondary payload by
unauthorized parties.
Stepping Stone An intermediate node between a source and destination. Often used to
disguise the true origin of a transmission.
Stylometry A literary technique using statistical methods to analyze various features (met-
rics) of a written document to ascertain shared authorship.
TCP See Transmission Control Protocol.
TLS See Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security.
Topology The set of network devices and links which comprise a network. Important in
making decisions regarding transmission of packets through a network.
Traffic The set of all packets transmitted on a link or set of links comprising a network.
Transmission Control Protocol The connection-oriented communication mechanism used
on top of the Internet Protocol to establish a reliable communication channel, which will
try to ensure optimal transmission.
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Threat A specific realization of a risk, which might use an exploit to take advantage of a
vulnerability in a system.
UDP See User Datagram Protocol.
Unclassified See Classification (Data).
Universal Serial Bus An interface for connecting peripherial devices to a computer system.
Of particular relevance to security, such devices can be used to plant Malware onto a
host system.
USB See Universal Serial Bus.
User Datagram Protocol The datagram-oriented communication mechanism used on top
of the Internet Protocol to send data from point-to-point without first establishing a
connection. No guarantees are made for delivery.
Vulnerability A flaw in a system which creates a risk.
Whitelist A list of entities allowed to access a resource. This implies all entities not on the
list are denied access. See also Blacklist.
Zero-day exploit An attack that makes use of a previously unknown vulnerability in a sys-
tem.
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